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Abstract
Open market share repurchases (OMRs) are a tool companies use to distribute 
cash to shareholders (similar to dividends), adjust their capital structure, use as a 
signaling device and a tool to reduce moral hazard, and reduce their tax liabilities. 
They can also be used as an investment by the company itself in which it buys 
back its own (undervalued) shares and thus makes a profit between the price paid 
and the fundamental value of the shares. While there is a considerable literature 
on most of these aspects, not much work has been conducted on the optimal 
timing of share repurchases as an investment tool for the company.
Given that the conduct of share repurchases has a large number of flexibilities 
which are at the discretion of the company and its managers, any model of share 
repurchases has to adequately address them. In this thesis a real options approach 
has been used to model share repurchases, which allows to include many of the 
flexibilities share repurchases offer. We investigate the optimal timing of share 
repurchases through a model in which once started, the repurchase is conducted 
in a single time period. This model is then subsequently extended to allow the 
repurchase program to be suspended and restarted in a multi-time period setting. 
We also derive the optimal repurchase amount in both cases.
We derive conditions on the difference between the fundamental value and price 
that would trigger the initiation of share repurchases for both models and analyze 
the dependencies of this trigger value on a number of variables such as the 
volatility of the shares. An empirical analysis of the share repurchases conducted 
by Taiwanese IT companies show broad support for the model developed in this 
thesis. However, the small sample size does not allow us to derive definitive 
conclusions and a larger sample needs to be investigated in future research.
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1,1 Definition and motivation o f share repurchases
Share repurchases are a mechanism by which companies return capital to their 
shareholders. The company acquires shares from existing shareholders in exchange 
for cash payment. They can either cancel the acquired shares and thus reduce their 
outstanding equity or retain the shares with the aim to redistribute them to new 
shareholders, e.g. as part of executive compensation plans or pension plans.
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A corporation has many motives for repurchasing its shares. The most important goals 
usually mentioned in the academic literature and by managers are as follows:
1. Substitution for dividends. Similar to dividends, share repurchases distribute cash 
to shareholders. The main difference between share repurchases and dividends is 
that with share repurchases, not all shareholders obtain this cash but only those 
who sell their shares to the company. The remaining shareholders benefit 
indirectly as the future cash flow of the company is divided among fewer shares 
which should increase the value of the remaining shares (Woods/Brigham, 1966; 
Ofer/Thakor, 1987).
2. Employee compensation. Companies routinely pay part of the compensation to 
senior managers in the form of stock options or as shares rather than use cash 
payments. The aim of these compensation plans is to align the interests of the 
managers with that of the company, thereby reducing the moral hazard problem. 
(Weisbenner, 2001; Jolls, 1998). The shares which are acquired in share 
repurchases can be used either for distribution to the beneficiaries of these 
compensation plans or are accumulated to achieve a sufficient number of shares
in relation to the corresponding stock options which may be exercised by 
managers holding such options.
3. Adjustment o f the capital structure. If shares are cancelled after they have been 
acquired by the company, this reduces the outstanding equity the company holds. 
Share repurchases can therefore be used as a tool to adjust the capital structure of 
the company. A similar result could obviously be achieved through the 
distribution of dividends (Leland/Pyle, 1977; Kim e ta l, 2003).
4. Takeover defence. A company may conduct a share repurchase as a measure to 
reduce the likelihood of an unfriendly takeover approach. This not only reduces 
the amount of cash held by the company, making it a less attractive target, but it 
also enables the company to reduce the number of shares an acquirer could easily 
buy from the open market. If the share repurchase is conducted such that any 
“friendly” shareholder, i.e. those who would not willingly sell his shares to an 
acquirer, are not selling their shares, while the non-strategic shareholders sell 
their shares, this would serve to increase the fraction of friendly shareholders, 
hence making a takeover approach less likely to succeed ( Vermaelen,1984).
3
5. Signalling motives. Managers may have better information than shareholder on 
the future prospects of the company. The decisions of managers can reveal this 
information to the market, thus acting as a signal; stock repurchases are one such 
signal which managers can use. The benefit to the manager and the company is 
that the stock price will react to this signal and adjust at least partially to the 
fundamental value.
6. Investment activity. Companies can also see their own stocks as investment 
vehicles, as much as any other securities they might invest in. Given the potential 
informational advantage the company has regarding the value of their own shares, 
share repurchases could be regarded as an attractive investment in cases where 
the market undervalues the shares (Vermaelen, 1981 and 1984; 
Maxwell/Stephens, 2003).
7. Support for the share price. Companies conducting share repurchases increase 
temporarily the demand for the shares, causing the share price to rise. Thus a 
company could use share repurchases as a tool to prevent a further fall of the 
share price, e.g. to avoid a violation of minimum equity requirements or to
4
prevent a takeover bid due to the low value of the shares (Ikenbery/Vermaelen,
1996).
8. Tax reduction. With dividends and capital gains taxed at different tax rates in 
some countries it can be more beneficial for some shareholders to sell their 
shares as part of a share repurchase programme of a company than to receive the 
same amount in dividends. In some countries where retained earnings are taxed 
at a lower rate than dividends, there are tax benefits to companies which conduct 
share repurchases. Share repurchases when used in this manner is a tax efficient 
way of distributing cash to shareholders (Woods/Brigham, 1996; 
Grullen/Michaely 2000).
1.2 Research aim
The aim of this thesis is to develop a method by which managers can decide on the 
optimal timing of a share repurchase. In doing this, we will focus exclusively on share 
repurchases as an investment activity by the company; any other motivations and 
complications which arise from share repurchases will be ignored.
As will be pointed out in chapter 2, companies have to announce their intention to 
conduct share repurchases well in advance of their commencement. As making such 
an announcement does not require the company to conduct the share repurchase, we 
can interpret it as the creation of an option to conduct share repurchases. The actual 
share repurchase occurs only upon the exercise of such an option. Using this idea, we 
will establish a framework using real options analysis to determine the conditions 
under which a company should exercise the option, i.e. conduct share repurchases. In 
using this approach, we follow the footsteps of the work by Ikenberry/Vermaelen 
(1996) but expand on their model in various ways.
The results derived in this thesis provide clear guidance to companies on the optimal 
timing of share repurchases and allows us to compare our theoretical results with the 
actual behaviour of companies in an empirical investigation. This investigation allows 
us to evaluate the relevance of our model for explaining actual share repurchases.
This thesis thus furthers our understanding of the optimal conduct of share 
repurchases and provides the first detailed study of share repurchases using real
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options analysis. When combining our results with that of the well established 
theories on share repurchases, it is possible to obtain a more complete picture of the 
motivation for conducting share repurchases.
1.3 Outline of the thesis
This thesis is organized into seven chapters. Chapter 7 is an introduction. The 
regulatory framework governing share repurchases in a number of countries is set out 
in chapter 2. This chapter establishes the main characteristics of share repurchase 
activities that justify the use of a real options approach for further analysis.
Chapter 3 will provide a review of the established theories and empirical evidence for 
share repurchases. We will discuss a number of basic theories and the empirical 
evidence supporting them as well as provide a critical analysis of their shortcomings.
We will provide a brief introduction to real options theory in chapter 4. By showing
that the regulatory framework set out in chapter 2 can be well interpreted in a real
options framework, we provide a detailed justification for our modelling approach.
The chapter will close with a brief overview of some recent applications of real
7
options analysis for corporate finance decisions, including the few contributions 
addressing share repurchases in such a framework.
Chapter 5 develops a model of share repurchases that is subsequently evaluated using 
real options analysis. We will derive the conditions under which share repurchases 
should be conducted and compare the results with those of models using different 
approaches when addressing the conduct of share repurchases.
By comparing the predictions of the models developed in chapter 5 with actual share 
repurchases by companies in chapter 6, we evaluate the relevance of our models for 
the explanation of real world observed behaviour. Using these results, we can then 
assess whether our models can explain some of the empirical findings and how much 
the results are driven by other forces which we did not include in our model.
Finally, in chapter 7, we conclude our results and provide a critical analysis of the 
limitations of our model as well as an outlook on future research.
Chapter 2 
Operation and Regulation 
of Share Repurchases
Share repurchases can be conducted in different ways: fixed price tender offers, Dutch 
auctions, or open market repurchases (hereafter OMRs). A significant fraction of 
share repurchases were fixed price tender offers and Dutch auctions before the middle 
of 1980’s. By 1994, OMRs represents over 95% of repurchase activity 
(Ikenberry/Vermaelen, 1996). From 1998 to 2001, over 68 countries, including the ten 
largest stock markets, implemented regulations and amendments to enable OMRs. It 
has since become the most popular corporate payout method (Kim et al. and Grullon/ 
Ikenberry, 2002).
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Table 2-1 Number and Value of Share Repurchase Announcement in the USA
Year Dutch Auctions Fixed Price Tender Offers Open Market
Cases Dollars
(mills)
Cases Dollars (mills) Cases Dollars (mills)
1980 - - 1 5 86 1429
1981 - - 44 1329 95 3013
982 - - 10 1164 129 3113
1983 - - 10 1352 53 2278
1984 1 9 67 10519 236 14910
1985 6 1123 36 13352 159 22786
1986 11 2332 20 5492 219 28417
1987 9 1502 42 4764 132 34787
1988 21 7695 32 3826 276 33150
1989 22 5044 49 1939 499 62873
1990 10 1933 41 3463 778 39733
1991 4 739 51 4715 282 16139
1992 7 1638 37 1488 447 32635
1993 5 1291 51 1094 461 35000
1994 10 925 52 2796 824 17036
1995 8 969 40 542 851 81591
1996 22 2774 37 2562 1111 157917
1997 30 5442 35 2552 967 163688
1998 20 2640 13 4364 1537 215012
1999 19 3817 21 1790 1212 137015
Source: Grullon/ Ikenberry (2002) What do we know about stock repurchase?
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Share repurchases are generally announced prior to the share buyback programme to 
signal the company’s private information. To avoid Issuers from manipulating market 
operations and misleading general investors’ judgment as regards publicly available 
information, the share buyback regulation governs the whole process of executing the 
share repurchase programme starting from ex ante disclosure, approval, repurchase 
conditions - timing condition, price condition, and volume condition to the ex post 
publishing of the financial statement. The regulation is different between countries. In 
order to properly analyze stock repurchases it is therefore necessary to investigate the 
regulations applicable. This then allows to make realistic assumption for the 
development of a model in subsequent chapters.
2.1 Forms of Repurchases
Stock repurchases can be conducted in one of three main forms: by tender offers, 
private negotiation repurchases, or open market repurchases.
Tender offers can be conducted in two different ways: fixed price tender offers or 
Dutch auctions. A fixed price tender offer is a broad solicitation by a company or a
third party to purchase a substantial percentage of company’s shares or units during a 
limited period of time. The offer is at a fixed price, usually at a premium over the 
current market price, and is contingent on shareholders tendering a minimum number 
of their shares or units.
Under the Dutch auction share repurchase method, the firm sets a range of prices for 
which each shareholder who elects to offer the shares to the company must select a 
single price at which to tender and has three to four weeks to do so. At the end of the 
offer period, those offers that exceed either a minimum price or such that a maximum 
number of shares are bought, are bought by the company. Therefore, all shareholders 
are paid the same price which is the clearing bid or lowest bid accepted (Gay et al, 
1996). The company generally reserves the right to repurchase more than the specified 
amount if it desires to do so. The United States is one of the few countries that allow 
corporations to make tender offer for their own shares at a premium above market 
prices.
Private negotiation is the least common repurchasing method and as the name implies, 
it involves the repurchase of stock from large holders through direct negotiations. In 
this type of transaction, either the shareholder or the corporation may initiate the
transaction negotiations.
In OMRs, a corporation gradually repurchases shares using open market transactions 
through an established broker. The transaction mechanism of OMRs is the same as 
that of the general public. Issuers announce a buyback price and amount, then execute 
the order through the market maker to conduct the repurchase. To prevent the illusory 
creation of widespread demand and hence the problem of price manipulation, the 
authorities regulate the relative provisions in terms of trade timing, price, and volume 
to provide a safe harbour to public investors. For instance, share repurchase within 30 
minutes of the market opening and closing times are prohibited to prevent companies 
from controlling opening and closing prices. Volume is also limited to 15 percent of 
the average daily trading volume.
Different repurchase approaches have arisen to cope with the diverse intentions of 
share repurchase in each corporation.
2.2 The Importance of Share Repurchases
Share repurchases have increased both in absolute and relative terms in proportion to
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the use of cash dividends in returning cash to shareholders (Ikenberry/Grullon; 2000). 
In the United States, share repurchases were a small percentage of cash dividend 
payouts in the 1970s. However, there has been a large upward shift in share 
repurchases since in 1984. Between 1984 and 1988, cash dividends have grown at a 
rate of 9.3% a year; gross share repurchases have grown at a compound annual 
growth rate of 13.6% per year. Studies also demonstrate that share repurchases have 
grown at a higher rate than cash dividends since 1980 (Ikenberry/Vermaelen; 1996); 
especially between 1995 and 1998, gross share repurchases grew at a compound 
annual rate of over 26%, compared with below 11% for aggregate cash dividends.
Apart from the significant growth of share repurchases in the United States, share 
repurchases have also been broadly permitted in other regimes which have undergone 
liberalization. For example, share repurchases have been implemented in , UK in 
1981, Switzerland in 1992, Japan in 1995, Canada in 1998, France in 1998, Germany 
in 1998, Hong Kong in 1998, Italy in 2000, Taiwan in 2000, and Netherlands in 2001. 
Based on the world stock market capitalization, the countries permitting OMRs make 
up over 86 percent of the world stock market capitalization.1
1 As recorded by the World Bank 2000.
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Baker et al. (1981) and Cook et al (2003), among others, even pointed out that 
3 companies have adopted share repurchases as an aggressive investment tool (the 
‘market timing’ motive) rather than as a passive cash distribution method. More 
academic studies, present in the following chapter, document OMRs’ power functions 
to revolutionize current financial operations. Whatever the viewpoints on the 
applicative volume, and the worldwide adoption of share repurchases, OMRs has 
changed current corporate finance operations and share repurchases have at least 
partially become a corporate investment consideration.
2.3 Regulatory Framework for OMRs
As mentioned above, OMRs are not permitted without certain restrictions. This 
section aims to examine the repurchase regulations of selected countries in order to 
analyse both significant repurchase conditions and associated flexibilities which 
include approval of repurchases, timing or duration repurchase condition, price 
condition, volume condition, and managerial flexibilities. The sample countries are 
the United States, Japan, UK, France, Germany, Canada, Italy, Netherlands, 
Switzerland, Hong Kong, and Taiwan. All the investigated countries and conditions 
are presented in Table 2-2.
(Insert Table 2-2 about here)
2.3.1 Approval o f  Repurchases
On the approval process in these sampled countries, there are three different types of 
approval processe: (i) no required approval (ii) shareholder meeting approval and (iii) 
board approval. Different approval methods provide different magnitudes of 
flexibility in the launch of share repurchases. The countries without the need for 
requirement of approval are the US and Japan. These countries have the most 
flexibility to execute share repurchases. They can react to market price changes 
immediately in order to stabilize the market share price. The countries that adopt the 
board approval method are France, Taiwan, Switzerland, and Canada. These four 
countries must still report relative repurchase information such as repurchase purpose, 
repurchase prices, repurchase period, and repurchase volumes to the board. Only 
when given the approval from the board can these companies execute their share 
repurchase programmes. The most inflexible approval method relates to seeking share 
repurchase approval during shareholder meetings. The shareholder meeting is usually 
held annually. The executive managers generally have to report their next year
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repurchase programme to the shareholders and seek their approvals. These countries 
are UK, Netherlands, Italy, Germany, and Hong Kong.
2.3.2 Timing and Duration o f  Share Repurchases
Countries have different regulations considerations regarding the corporate sector’s 
ability to time the market using OMRs. The United States and Japan focus on the 
limitations of daily transaction. The other sampled countries focus on the time factor 
of repurchase duration. Timing condition restricts the periods during which issuers 
may bid for or purchase its common stock. Duration of repurchases is considered to 
be a significant indicator of the direction of trading, the strength of demand, and 
current market value of securities. Such consideration is similar to an investment 
consideration. The time restriction regulation adopted by the United States and Japan 
is intended to prevent speculators from manipulating the market price. For instance, 
repurchase trading is prohibited for the last 30 minutes of a trading day (Grullen, 
2000).
The second type of restriction is repurchase duration. Although OMRs are not an 
obligation, the authority gives a duration constraint to manage the company’s right to
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buy back their outstanding shares. Companies can arbitrarily execute their buyback 
strategy during the valid time period. Otherwise, they are not allowed to do it .The 
duration of a share repurchase programme is normally between 12 and 18 months and 
is dependent on the particular country’s rules. Countries which have this time 
restriction are UK, Netherlands, France, Italy, Germany, Taiwan, Switzerland, Hong 
Kong, and Canada. Other countries such as France and Hong Kong do not only 
restrict the duration of repurchase, but they also embody a stricter repurchase timing 
provision within a smaller time interval.
2.3.3 Price Restrictions
Price conditions govern the price of share repurchase. It prevents issuers from 
manipulating price through repurchase activity. For example, the repurchase 
transactions cannot be made at a price that is higher than the most recent closing price. 
In terms of price restrictions, except for the United States, Switzerland, and Hong 
Kong, countries such as Germany and Netherlands have regulations that ensure that 
the repurchase price follows the permitted highest buyback price in the shareholder 
meeting. Canada and Italy stipulate that the buyback price is no higher than the recent 
high market price while in France and Taiwan the buyback price cannot exceed the
daily highest price. Japan and UK also have similar conditions regarding buyback 
price. Thus, each country has regulations as regards the buyback price in order to 
prevent potential market manipulation.
2.3.4 Limits on Repurchase Volume
Repurchase volume conditions limit the amount of securities that issuers may 
repurchase in a market in a single day or within a valid execution period. Volume 
conditions are designed to prevent issuers from dominating the market as per its 
securities through substantial purchasing activity. Similarly, there are various caps on 
repurchase share volume in all sampled countries. In this regard, Canada has the 
strictest condition in relation to repurchase volume. It requires that the company 
cannot repurchase more than 10% of its public float, 5% of its total shares, or 2% in 
20 days. France, Italy, Taiwan, and Hong Kong also have repurchase volume 
constraints to the total shares and daily or monthly transaction volume. Other 
countries have either repurchase volume constraint to total issued shares or daily 
transaction, the restriction in the United States on repurchasing no more than 25% of 
the repurchase volume in a single trading day has been suspended in September 2001. 
The UK has a volume constraint of no more than 15% of its total shares.
19
2,3,5 Managerial Flexibility
In contrast to repurchase provisions, flexibilities of OMRs have not been legislated in 
many formal documents. Although companies in many cases establish repurchase 
plans2, which state the intended repurchase amount and maximal price, the duration of 
execution, companies still have the managerial flexibilities to react to the changes in 
open market, so as to adjust their repurchase strategy. For instance, issuers may 
postpone the repurchase until conditions are more favorable (deferral option), decide 
to repurchase a smaller amount than originally planned (reduction), or even abandon 
the plan (abandonment option) before the end of the repurchase period. Thus OMRs 
have a large number of flexibilities and are not a fixed commitment, allowing 
managers to react to changed market conditions by varying the amounts repurchased 
as well as ending and re-starting the repurchase activity. To conclude, OMRs are not a 
firm commitment but have many flexibilities and managers can use these embodied 
flexibilities to create the maximum profit for their shareholders.
2 Repurchase Plan: Programme through which a company buys back its own shares in the open market. 
Most companies announce their repurchase plan which serves as an indication that the corporation's 
management believes the company’s stock price to be undervalued. Also, it reveals the future 
repurchase details to the investing public. It is announced before their execution.
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2.4 Summary
Stock repurchases have increased in importance considerably over the last years and 
have become an important tool in corporate finance. While several forms of 
repurchases exist, the most common form has become open market share repurchase 
in which the company buys its own shares in the market.
Share repurchases are regulated in various ways, differing across countries. By
putting restrictions on the prices companies can pay for their own shares, the amount
repurchased and the timing of repurchases the regulators seek to ensure a minimum of
investor protection. Despite these regulations, companies and their management are
given a large degree of freedom and flexibility in the conduct of share repurchases;
therefore any modeling of share repurchases has to adequately include these
*
flexibilities. In the following chapters we will thus argue that using a real options 
approach is a useful way to address such flexibilities.
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Chapter 3 
Theories on share 
repurchases
In this chapter, we will review the current academic literature on share repurchases. 
We organize the literature by the different functions attributed to share repurchases: 
share repurchases as tools in financial decision making, as a signaling device, as a 
device to reduce moral hazard, as an investment decision, and finally we discuss the 
contingent valuation of share repurchases.
The investigational scope of this review makes references across a single 
classification as defined in this chapter. Besides, this reference review mainly focuses 
on the study of OMRs. The other study regarding different share buyback approaches 
such as representative studies of tender offer and the Dutch auction will also be 
selectively reviewed in this chapter.
3.1 Share repurchases as tools in financial decision making
Research over the last two decades have found that stock repurchases have 
contributed a significant proportion to internal financial corporate governance, i.e. as 
a means of cash distribution to shareholders, capital structure fine-tuning, takeover 
defense, and tax optimization. Implementation of stock repurchases has an impact on 
the cash levels of companies as well as their capital structure. Research in this area 
was initiated by Woods/ Brigham (1966) and other significant studies in this field are 
further surveyed in the remainder of this section.
3.1.1 Share repurchases as substitutes fo r  dividends
Historically, companies have used dividends as a means of returning cash to their 
shareholders and hence dividend payments are viewed as a form of shareholder value 
creation. These dividends may be paid out directly to shareholders in two ways, either 
through cash dividends or share dividends. The shareholder’s wealth is increased from 
the receipt of dividends from the company. Share buyback reduces the number of 
outstanding shares and hence increases the earnings per share that could be attributed 
to existing shareholders, so that shareholder value increases in that perspective. Both
approaches are perceived to be equivalent methods of shareholder value creation, i.e. 
economic equivalents, provided that the share buyback is implemented at attractive 
price levels.
Woods/ Brigham (1966) concluded that the long-run and short-run situations can have 
different implications with respect to stock repurchases and dividends. Both types of 
corporate money distribution policies can be manipulated to reach the maximal value 
target. Ofer/Thakor (1987) documented that stock repurchases and dividend 
distributions are employed at different times and the two functions independently. As 
regards the suitable opportunity of executing stock repurchases, Williams (1988), 
Brennam/ Thakor (1990), and Grullon/ Michaely (2000) documented that stock 
repurchase is an intermediate financial policy where a firm confronts external 
economic changes during the span of a business cycle. Brennam/Thakor (1990) found 
that dividends are likely to be the choice for the smallest distributions, and that tender 
offer repurchases will dominate very large cash distributions. Li/McNally (1999) 
indicated that a firm prefers open market repurchase in times of market turbulence or 
weak business conditions. Regarding the substitution hypothesis, Grullon/MichNally 
(2002) revealed that American companies are gradually increasing the payout on 
stock repurchase programmes. However, the growth of dividend forecasts is
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negatively correlated with share repurchase activity which verifies the substitution 
hypothesis.
The Modigliani-Miller Irrelevance Theorem states that dividend payments as well as 
share repurchases should not affect the value of a company and thus it should be futile 
to investigate their impact. In the presence of agency costs and asymmetric 
information as well as inefficient markets this has however not to be true and dividend 
payments as well as share repurchases are relevant.
3.1.2 Adjusting the capital structure
Research in this field has found that repurchase approaches generally take the form of 
tender offers and Dutch auction methods when used for buying back larger portions of 
stock and OMRs are employed for buying back a smaller portion of shares. However, 
it is possible that corporations repurchase shares from the open market to avoid 
significantly impacting their financial leverage ratios in any one single repurchase 
programme. Research in this field can be roughly sorted into two different study 
approaches: one studies the risk of executing stock repurchases while the other studies 
the effect of executing stock repurchases on the internal corporate structure. 
Guffy/Schneider (2004) has also found that companies use share repurchases to adjust
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its financial leverage benefit via the tax advantage of debt financing.
With the hypothesis that stock repurchase is a form of financial intermediation, 
Leland/Pyle (1977) indicated that executing share repurchases carries a lower risk to 
adjust a corporate capital structure. Share repurchases can significantly decrease a 
firm’s total risk or return volatility. Besides, the actual buyback trading activity of a 
repurchase firm is negatively associated with the volatility change and the CAPM beta 
change (Hertzel/Jain, 1991; and Kim et al., 2003). Jensen (1986) declared that 
repurchases use up a firm’s free cash flow, and hence, mitigate the agency costs 
associate with the separation of ownership and control to prevent the agent from 
engaging in negative net present value. Billingsely et al (1989) have also studied 
share repurchase behaviour on bank holding companies (BHC). Their studies have 
pointed out that empirical share repurchase announcements are associated with an 
increase in the total riskiness of BHC stock.
3,1,3 Share repurchases as a takeover defence
Vermaelen (1984) used quantitative methods to investigate the use of share 
repurchases as a tool of takeover defence. Managerial incentives which are related to
preventing take-over bids and executive stock options are taken into account as the 
decision parameters when it prices securities. Bagnoli/ Lipman (1989) provided the 
only analytical study of stock repurchases serving as a takeover defence measure by 
signaling private information. Their study is similar to the general signaling model, 
taking the value-maximum as a main objective. However, since the managers’ 
incentives have been defined as defensive uses, their study implies that there are too 
few takeovers for business operation efficiency. There is a different research approach, 
which is based on the use of economic and financial theory to establish an analytical 
model to explain how the OMRs can serve as a takeover defence measure. Depending 
on supply-demand theory, Bagwell (1991) simply derived an equilibrium model to 
explain that managers can employ share repurchases as a tool to deter takeover. Sinha 
(1991) assumed that managers can use debt-financed share repurchase as a takeover 
defence. The optimal level of share repurchase is the result of a trade-off between the 
benefit of a reduced probability of takeover and the cost of an increased probability of 
bankruptcy.
3.1.4 Tax optimization
It is rare that an analytical model can be used to explain the tax savings advantage of
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executing share repurchases since different countries/states adopt different taxation 
regulations. Most studies in this field are based on empirical studies. Woods/Brigham 
(1966) pointed out that employing share repurchases probably can eliminate equity 
costs than through the use of dividends. Masuli (1980) indicated that the tax shield 
provides a significant incentive to execute share repurchases. Bagwell/Shoven (1989) 
revealed that share repurchases save more tax payments than dividend issues. Green/ 
Hollifield (1999) also found that personal tax savings in corporate decisions can also 
have the same research result. Considering the economic cycle, McNally (1999) 
conducted a similar study but failed to provide a clear incremental explanation. This 
tax shield is contingent on different taxation hypotheses and regulations. Despite this 
the controversial research conclusion, there is no other references documented that 
indicate stock repurchases to have an adverse effect on corporate taxation or personal 
taxation. Grullon/Michaely (2000) find that there is a 26-28 percent tax shield 
advantage in using stock repurchases rather than through dividend policy.
3.2 Share repurchases as a signalling device
Signalling is a method that corporate managers use to reduce information asymmetry. 
There are occasions when corporate managers have good news about future company
profitability but which is not yet reflected in the prevailing stock price since investors 
only have access to publicly available information. This results in a stock being priced 
below its intrinsic value. Consequently, corporate managers would attempt to 
eliminate this form of pricing discrepancy by publicly announcing the good news to 
investors with the subsequent upward adjustment of the stock price to reflect this 
incremental new information. Share repurchases, as such, also represent a form of 
signalling in that it signals to investors that the company’s share price is undervalued. 
The early signalling literature on share repurchase focuses on repurchase tender offer 
(Dann,1981; Vermaelen, 1981) and develop models consistent with the signaling of 
share undervaluation. Miller/Rock (1985) pointed out that both stock repurchases and 
dividend issues are able to signal these companies’ better information to support their 
outstanding share price. Dann (1981) and Vermaelen (1981) find stock repurchases to 
be a valid method to salvage the undervalued stock price. Furthermore, Bhattacharya 
(1979) argued that managers will use stock repurchases to save the undervalued price 
and forgo a profitable investment.
Recent studies have focused on stock price behaviour surrounding open market share 
repurchases in different circumstances such as a manager’s incentive, market 
participants’ response and repurchase strategy to corporate internal financial devices.
McNally (1999) pioneered a significant research framework to study how stock price 
behaviour is affected when the repurchase amount is varied, and when risk and a 
firm’s earning form part of the endogenous variables. Isagawa (2000, 2002) adopted a 
similar framework to study the manager’s private benefits and long term stock price 
performance. In his previous study (Isagawa, 2000), he focused on managers’ private 
benefits when real investment opportunities are unprofitable in terms of firm value 
without the restriction that the announcement are commitments. Later, Isagawa (2002) 
demonstrated why a firm still executes its repurchase programme even when the stock 
price is raised. Depending on the asymmetry information assumption and different 
market participants’ responses, Isagawa (2002) believes that a firm may achieve a 
long-term profit from the execution of its share repurchase plan.
Grullon (2004), Maxwell/ Stephens (2003) overlook the OMRs signaling effect to the 
stock price and bond price changes. In explaining the returns, the bond returns are 
more negative and stock returns more positive for large share repurchase programmes. 
Howell/Payne (2004) studied the rational sequence of announcement and repurchase 
action. They find that repurchases in the context of a previous stock (i.e. based 
acquisition) have a less positive market reaction than do otherwise comparable 
repurchases with no acquisition.
30
3.3 Share repurchases as a device to reduce moral hazard
The separation of ownership and management causes agency problems. For example, 
managers may allocate excessive company risk for over-investing or over-investing in 
unprofitable projects. Share repurchases can reduce free cash flow to reduce the moral 
hazard of an investment (Danies/Danies, 1993), Lang/Litzerberger (1989) and Lie 
(2000). They maintain companies that execute share repurchases have a higher 
Tobin’s Q3. Repurchase announcements reduce management’s ability to divert capital 
to uses that are not in the best interest of shareholders. Share buybacks signal that 
management has a focus on shareholder value creation, because it is returning cash to 
shareholders and sends a signal that management is not engaged in non-value 
enhancing activities.
Jolls (1998) studied the incentives of the agents, the issuers, to explain the puzzles 
concerning a firm’s payout behaviour, and also studied the effects of executive 
compensation package on managerial incentives. The stock option-based restricted 
stock is significantly more likely to be a form of compensation to top executives.
Such restricted stock compensation is not diluted by dividend payments in his
Tobin’s Q: represents the value of a company given by financial markets divided by the value of a 
company's assets. If the market value reflected solely the recorded assets of a company, Tobin's Q 
would be 1.0. High Tobin's Q values encourage companies to invest more in capital because they are 
"worth" more than the price they paid for them.
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sampled firms. Weisbenner (2000) studied the effect of general share repurchase from 
the open market by different parties. He concluded that the larger the option held by 
top executives, the more apt the firm is to retain more earnings and curtail cash 
distribution.
3.4 Share repurchases as investment decisions
The most frequently cited reason for initiating an open market share repurchase 
programme is that a firm considers its stock to be undervalued and is therefore a good 
investment (Cook et al., 2003), i.e., by buying their own companies’ shares, they can 
expect a high return. Information asymmetries continue to exist between corporate 
managers and their outside investors. As such, the former generally have better 
information and are therefore able to make a good investment simply by buying back 
their undervalued shares. The existence of such undervalued shares implies that the 
market is not efficient, either in the strong or semi-strong form. In an efficient market 
the timing of repurchases to make profitable investments would not be possible. 
Research in this field can be categorized into four main research approaches. Firstly, 
most of these studies, such as Masulis (1980), Vermaelen (1981), Dann et al. (1991), 
Hertzel/Jain (1991), Dharan/Ikenberry (1995), Ikenberry et al. (1995),
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Ikenberry/Vermaelen (1996), Lie/McConnell (1998), and Cook et al (2003) addressed 
the share price changes surrounding the share buyback announcement. The consensus 
is that there is a negative return surrounding stock repurchases before the 
announcement of the share buyback; then there follows a small positive short-term 
return. The share repurchases have a much more significant impact as regards the long 
run performance. The literature concluded that the above research results are a 
consequence of the initial announcement and share repurchase reaction which indeed 
provides some support for the mispricing story. Initially the market is slow to react to 
this information due to market inefficiencies. In the long run, however, the market 
fully adjusts.
Secondly, the stock repurchases offer a form of flexible manipulation in a future 
environment of uncertainty. It is not a commitment policy, and firms are authorized to 
decide when and how much share buyback is to be completed in an environment of 
uncertain market change. A study conducted by Kirch/Bamic (1998) concluded that 
the non-fulfilling firms are more likely to incur a poorer stock return than fulfilling 
firms. This result bears an inverse effect to the principle of the flexibility of share 
repurchases.
Thirdly, recent repurchase studies have started to discuss the applications and the 
influence of repurchased shares on stock options. Jolls (1988) studied the effects of 
the issue of different types of stock options on the firms’ future earning per share 
(hereafter EPS) change and managers’ incentives. He found that firms which rely 
heavily on stock-option-based compensation are significantly more likely to 
repurchase their stock than firms which rely less heavily on stock options to 
compensate their top executives. Further, Jolls (1988) found no such relationship 
between repurchases and restricted stock, an alternative form of stock-based 
compensation that, unlike stock options, is not diluted by dividend payments. These 
findings have implications for the study of other puzzles concerning a firm’s payout 
behaviour as well as the study of the effects of executive compensation package on 
managerial incentives. Weisbenner (2000) found that an analysis of panel data for a 
sample of large firms suggested that firms conduct ongoing repurchases of shares over 
the life of an option which undo much of the dilution to EPS that results from past 
stock option grants. Option grants in general are associated with increased share 
repurchases and increased total payouts. However, the larger the executives’ holding 
of stock options, the more apt the firm is to retain more earnings and curtail cash 
distributions. Weston/Siu (2002) believed that stock prices represent the discounted 
value of expected future net cash flows providing the ability to make large gains.
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Hence it has the ability to benefit from the capitalized value of expected favorable 
future earning growth that makes stock options valuable.
Finally, the executive timing issue has been emphasized during the past few years. 
StephensAVeisbach (1998) examined quarterly repurchase volume in the United States 
and found that the repurchase is negatively correlated to prior returns and positively 
related to both expected and unexpected future cashflows. Ikenberry et al. (2000) 
documented that a set of Canadian firms increased their repurchase activities in the 
months following a price drop. Cook et al. (2003) documented that the timing of 
OMRs execution in the United States is related to the bid-ask spread, liquidity, and 
firm-specific information. Ginglinger/Hamon (2003) studied the share price 
performance of French companies following share repurchases. Fairchild and Zhang 
2006) develop a model of repurchase timing in which investors are slow to react to 
the announcement and conduct of share repurchases. This market inefficiency allows 
managers to time the market and depending on conditions they are finishing their 
repurchase activities either over short or long time periods.
Their results show that the managerial timing ability is far from uniform. On average, 
firms on share repurchase disclosure do not succeed in repurchasing shares at a lower
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price than that by other investors. Put simply, the issuers ignored timing flexibility. 
Therefore, most of them failed to capitalize on this valued flexibility.
3.5 Contingent valuation o f share repurchases
OMRs are conducted in an uncertain public market, their contingent value 
demonstrate stochastic behaviour. A deterministic pricing method fails to catch such 
risk premium investment. Ikenberry/Vermalen (1996) identified OMRs as an 
exchange investment and pioneered a contingent value study on price as a 
fundamental basis for further study. The contingent value of stock repurchases 
includes the market price increase that results from the substantial outstanding share 
reduction and the value of outstanding shares exchanged to internal corporate 
holdings. The appraisal technique of exchange value is based on Margrabe’s study 
(1978) “The Value of an Option to Exchange one for another”, which assumes that the 
underlying transaction is in compliance with a type of European Option.
3.6 Summary
The literature documents that share repurchase programmes in corporate internal
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governance can be used as a means of dividend substitution, pro-active takeover 
defence, tax saving, and corporate structure fine-tuning. However, the application of 
stock repurchases to external share return has had controversial study results. 
Generally speaking, post-announcement of a share buyback, a small positive short 
term return results which is then overshadowed by a much more significant long run 
performance.
The interest of shareholders would imply that the manager executes the stock 
repurchase such that the profits are maximized. In the presence of agency problems, 
however, the manager would tend to maximize his own profits, which might result in 
actions which are contrary to those of the shareholders. To form the optimal model, he 
is aware of the need to analyse the interrelationships between its functions. The 
relationship between share repurchases and dividend distribution is a time lag 
function, and they are independent of each other within the same time-frame. 
Therefore, managers can simply consider how to execute this financial policy as a 
single objective when managers plan to distribute money to shareholders.
It is hard to use an analytical model to predict how much tax can be saved by 
executing stock repurchases, thus an empirical study is recommended to evaluate the
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amount of tax savings. It is possible to exclude the issue of tax savings alone when 
deriving a maximum contingent value for a valuation model. Besides, as regards the 
impact of stock repurchases on the external stock return, the majority of references 
documented that stock repurchases only have a short term benefit. This argument 
implies that stock repurchases can only be adopted to yield a contingent value and 
therefore managers can adopt this policy to precede a takeover defense at a lower 
price. Finally, the functions of pro-active takeover defense and corporate structure 
fine-tuning can be ruled out as long as we can optimise this programme.
Given the variety of possible motives for share repurchases, it is in all cases important 
for the managers to conduct the share repurchase in the best way possible, e.g. 
through an optimal timing and repurchase strategy.
flcenberry/Vermaelen (1996) use option-based theory to pioneer the contingent 
evaluation of the OMRs. They adopted a simple exchange option with assumptions of 
a fixed transaction day, and a given strike price quotation, so that their model is weak 
in explaining the inherent stock repurchases’ flexibilities; OMRs is a non-commitment 
American-type call option with repurchase timing/duration, repurchase price, and 
repurchase volume conditions/ flexibilities. To reach an optimal performance of
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executing OMRs, managers have to treat executing OMRs as a form of investment 
behaviour. Managers have to depend on the best timing and the best trigger price to 
create benefits for their long-term shareholders. Such derivative financial behaviour 
which derives their values from the underlying(s) in an uncertain risky market has 
become an important focus in modem financial markets. And this subject has also 
provided challenging research problems. Aimed at closing this research gap, this 




The theory of real options
The real-options approach applies financial options theory to real investments, such as 
manufacturing plants, product line extensions, and research and development. A 
financial option gives the owner the right, but not the obligation, to buy or sell a 
security at a given price. Analogously, companies that make strategic investments 
have the right, but not the obligation, to exploit these opportunities in the future. For 
instance, a company may postpone a share repurchase until conditions are more 
favourable (deferral option), decide to repurchase a smaller amount than originally 
planned (option to contract), or even abandon the plan (abandonment option) 
altogether. Those discretions are valuable and they often govern whether a project is 
survivable and ultimately deliverable.
Unfortunately, the traditional capital evaluation model, the net present value (NPV) 
rule, leads to a suboptimal investment decision when part of the investment costs are 
already sunk and managers have some discretions about timing flexibility. An 
option-based pricing technique is therefore established to adapt to such flexibility in 
order to conduct future actions in response to altered future market conditions and to 
enhance an investment opportunity. To evaluate investment flexibility, developments 
of financial and real options pricing techniques have slowly matured to incorporate 
complex financial projects and real asset investments. The essence of the analytic 
techniques of real options, commonly known as real option analysis (hereafter ROA), 
is to combine the strategic intuition and analytical rigor into an advanced pricing 
technique.
4.1 Real vs. financial options
In general, the financial option pricing technique has been employed to price the 
closed form European type derivatives such as the European option. A financial 
option gives its owner the right but not an obligation to purchase or sell a security at a 
given price. Real option analysis extends financial option theory, of which the most
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famous model is the Black-Scholes model, with strategic applications to options on 
real or non-financial assets. In other words, ROA is derived from financial theory with 
considerations of the investment strategies to be a new financial pricing technique. 
The commonality can be supported from the two classic option-based studies 
conducted by Merton (1973), and Dixit/Pindyck (1994). Both the authors assumed the 
option value to be contingent on one or more underlying asset(s), and its 
instantaneous change is a Brown-Wiener motion. Depending on Ito’s Lemma and the 
mathematical optimal theory, the diffusion of option value can be obtained from both 
financial option pricing techniques and real option analysis.
Despite ROA and financial options being developed to evaluate the flexibilities of an 
investment, they, however, have differences in their assumptions and applications. 
The Black-Scholes model is well-known to incorporate five parameters to appraise 
the option value, being the rate of return, variance, time to maturity, stock price, and 
the strike price. The measurement of variance in financial options is usually derived 
from the easily observed historical prices of the underlying assets. But there are 
almost by definition no historical numbers to be used when managers evaluate a real 
estate investment or an innovative project. Besides, the future investment cost is hard 
to obtain for a real investment. For example, the buyback cost of executing OMRs is
decided by the spot price at that time of purchase which is in turn decided by market 
participants. There is no market quotation of a strike price at the expiry date or the 
date that issuers intend to buy, i.e., the project is done at a cost equal to the investment 
required. Finally, there is a distinguish between financial option and real options. 
With a financial option, the more time we have before we commit to buying the 
underlying asset, the more valuable the option. This makes sense because the stock 
has more time to increase in value, and if it does not, we need not exercise, so 
financial options with longer expiration periods have more value than those with 
shorter lives (all other things being equal). This logic does not extend to the real world, 
however. The option to delay a product launch will not necessarily add value to a 
project because the investor may end up paying a discount penalty and could even end 
up missing the market altogether. The relationship between time and value is much 
less consistent with real options than it is with financial options (van 
Putten/MacMillan; 2004).
4.2 The basics of real options analysis
The development of a continuous-time of ROA pricing technique has a consolidated 
process of model setup and a solution process. The process of model setup
incorporates the stochastic financial theory, expectations theory, and the 
mathematically optimal theory. The solution process employs complicated 
engineering mathematics to solve the optimal decision making model (system).
In the first stage of model setup, one needs to make assumptions on the option value, 
defined as F(S,t )  , which is contingent on the underlying asset, S . It is assumed 
that the underlying asset follows a simple Brown-Wiener process in continuous time:
JO
*/(lnS,)«  —  = a sdt + ersdz (4-1)
S
where
a s : drift of underlying asset
<rs : variance of asset
dzs is a standard Brown-Wiener process.
A contingent value is considered as a function that is twice differentiated with respect 
to S and once with respect to t , and this is then denoted as F{S , t) . Eq (4-1) is not 
differentiable, so we need to work with function of dynamic programming to let the 
function of contingent value exist as an optimal function. The expansion function of
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this contingent value is:
(4-2)
Eq.(4-2) has an optimal stopping problem in continuous time because an investment 
opportunity, F (S , t ), yields no cash flows up to the time of exercise (T)  that the 
investment is undertaken, and the only return from holding it is its capital appreciation. 
Hence in the continuous region, the above exercise strategy can be written as Eq.
interval*#, the total expected return on the investment opportunity,pFdt , is equal to 
its expected rate of capital appreciation. Substituting Eq. (4-1) into Eq. (4-2), we then 
cam have
4 For facilitating the following derivation, the sub-notation is ignored
5 Bellman’s Principle of Optimality: An optimal policy has the property that, whatever the initial action, 
the remaining choices constitute an optimal policy with respect to the sub-problem starting at the 
stated results from the initial actions
(4-3)4
pFdt = E (dF) (4-3)
where:
p : expected rate of capital appreciation
Eq. (4-3) is the Bellman’s Principle of Optimality5 which indicates that over a time
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± CT2S2Fss + aSFs - p F  = -F, (4-4)
where
Fs : is the first differential of F  by underlying price 
Fss : is the second differential of F  by underlying price
Ft : is the first differential of F  by time
In a real investment consideration, the instantaneous change of the option value in 
time factor could be vanishing in two scenarios. One is that the factor has only a slight 
influence on the option value. People can simply ignore its existence. The other
scenario is that a real investment can last for longer project life. The option has
infinite life, i.e., the project does not expire and thus time is irrelevant. In this case, Eq. 
(4-4) can be derived as
Eq. (4-5) is the Black-Scholes differential equation without considering the influence 
of the time factor. Eq. (4-5) has many solutions, corresponding to all the different
^ s S 2 f ss +  a s S F s  ~  p F  =  0 (4-5)
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derivations that can be defined with S as the underlying variable. The particular 
derivative obtained when the equation is solved depends on the boundary conditions 
that are used. These specify the values of the derivative at the boundaries of possible 
value of S .  In the case of an investment with an investment cost, C , the key 
boundary condition that we can observe is the payoff from exercising the option and 
this is given by
F(S,t)  = S - C  (4-6)
and
Fs (S,t) = 1 (4-7)
and
KmF(S,t)  = 0 (4-8)
As in American option pricing problems of this sort, there will be a trigger value, S*, 
where the investor will exercise the option to trigger his/her investment to create the 
maximal profit for their shareholders.
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The first boundary condition is commonly termed the “value-matching” condition. 
The instantaneous profit from exercising option has to equal the value of option to 
wait. In that the issuers will receive a net payoff S* - C . The second boundary 
condition is known as the “high-contact” or “smooth-pasting” condition. Essentially, 
this condition ensures that the trigger is optimal. Final boundary conditions are 
imposed: lim F [S ,t) = 0. This is the result of the fact that if the value of investment
goes to zero, the investment will never be exercised and will therefore become 
worthless. So far, the dynamic optimal pricing model, a homogeneous second order 
differential model, has been set up. The complete model derivation is presented in the 
Appendix A.
Eq.(4-5) is an Euler equation, which has a general solution 
F = 4 S fi'+A2Sp* (4-9)
Eq.(4-7) restrains that the A1 has to be zero (the A2SPl is not satisfied by the
boundary conditions of \im F (S ,t) = 0) so that leaves the general solution of Eq.
(4-9) as
F = AiSp' (4-10)
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Substituting Eq. (4-9) into Eq. (4-4), the value of /? can be obtained
(4-11)
So far, the unbounded optimal contingent value differential equation has been found.
Next, we can rely on the general solution of Eq. (4-10) with the investor’s 
expectations revenue function and the high contact conditions to solve the optimal 
trigger point of OMRs.
Firstly, by differentiating Eq. (4-11) by S and then letting the new differential 
equation to be equal to Eq. (4-7), we can solve the equation as:
or
we can write A = (4-12)
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Substituting Eq. (4-12) into Eq. (4-10) and letting it be equal to Eq. (4-6), we can 
solve the optimal contingent value evaluation model with imposed boundary 
conditions.
(S*)1 ^± - ± — x S ' = S ' - C
A
S = - ^ — C (4-13)A - i
F [ s \ t )  = -(ft ^  x f “ ^ l  C* = - ^ —  (4-14)1 } ( Af c* - '  I a - 1  J A - i
and the coefficient of the general solution is given by:
s' ~c ( A - i f ' 1 
(s-)^ (Afc*-4 = 7 ^ - = ; ? ^ -  <4-l5>
Eq. (4-13) to Eq. (4-15) give the optimal investment rule, when S* > C , the optimal 
contingent investment value, . Furthermore, Eq. (4-11), Eq (4-13), and Eq.
(4-15) also illustrate several financial theories. Eq. (4-11) demonstrates that /?, is
50
bigger or equal to 1, thus the value of ^  is bigger or equal to 1 andF(S'V) > C .
P\
This result proves that the simple net present value (NPV) rule is incorrect. The 
uncertainty and irreversibility derive there is a wedge between the trigger value/ 
critical value, S* and investment cost, C .
4.3 Applications of real options analysis
This section will first introduce the issues of real options that issuers will have when 
they conduct OMRs programme. A further competitive option-based pricing theory 
will also be discussed as well. Finally, the sequential occurring option model will also 
be analysed and studied thoroughly.
4.3.1 Investment abandonment and deferral
The conventional capital budgeting approach considers two alternatives: invest now 
or decline the investment. Usually this approach does not consider possibilities of 
abandoning a project before completion nor opportunities to defer or postpone an 
investment. The possibility to abandon a project, if it later turns out to be less 
attractive, constitutes a valuable option. Similarity, the opportunity to defer an
investment decision to times when some of the uncertainties might be eliminated 
creates a valuable option (Brealey/Myers, 1996).
The investment abandonment and deferral perspectives arguably have two 
applications in strategic decision analyses. The abandonment option is an option to 
close out an investment prior to the fulfillment of the original conditions for 
termination. Formally it is an American put (Copeland/Antikarov; 2000). The 
abandonment option perspective applies particularly well to retractable investments. 
The abandonment option is typically constructed as sequential or staged investment 
paths, so the firm has the opportunity to abandon the project at different points in time 
during the development period. Researches in this field are mostly in research and 
design stages. McGrath (1997) developed a real options logic to analyse technology 
investment decisions. He (1997) provides a thorough discussion of how various 
sources of uncertainty, e.g. technological risk as well as input cost variability impact 
investment decisions. Childs/Triantis (1999) examined dynamic research and design 
investment policies and the valuation of research and design programmes in a real 
option framework. Schwartz (2004) extended the abandonment valuation method 
which considers research and design projects and patents via the simulation method.
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The deferral option is an American call option found in most projects where one has the right 
to delay the start of a project. An initial development investment might lead to several 
business opportunities, each representing different potential irreversible resource 
commitments. The deferral option perspective is particularly suited to the analysis of 
irreversible investment commitments. Its exercise price is the money invested in getting 
the project started. Irreversible investment decisions refer to the subsequent resource 
commitments on real and intangible assets, e.g. production plants. Researchers in this 
field include Reinganum (1981), Fudenberg/Tirole (1985), and Riordan (1992). One 
common feature of this literature is the competition between participants. Two effects 
are typically present: preemption incentives, which lead to early adoption and 
information spillovers, which lead to late adoption. Besides, Farrell/Galini (1988) 
show that a monopolist might want to license its technology to a competitor as a 
means of commitment not to increase future price and this helps solve a hold-up 
problem. Cabral/Dezso (2006) incorporated game theory into option to defer to study 
the optimal competitive strategy amongst different market participants.
4.3.2 Sequential Investment
In many situations, decisions are made sequentially and in a particular order. Such an
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investment is called a sequential investment. The above deferral option and 
abandonment option exist in a sequential type investment. The key characteristic of a 
sequential investment is the ability to temporarily or permanently stop investing if the 
value of the completed project falls, or if the expected cost of completing the 
investment rises (If one had no choice but to complete the project once it had been 
started, investing would once again involve only a single decision.) This probability 
of stopping midstream makes these investments analogous to compound options; each 
stage completed (or dollar invested) gives the firm an option to complete the next 
stage (or invest the next dollar). The investment problem boils down to finding a 
contingent plan for making these sequential (and irreversible) expenditures.
The compound option has two basic definitions, namely simultaneous compound 
options and sequential compound options. The key feature of “simultaneous” 
compound options is that the underlying option and the option on it are both 
simultaneously available - both options are alive during the same interval of time, the 
call contingent on the equity is a simultaneous compound option.
In a sequential compound option, on the other hand, one option is created only when
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the first option has been exercised. Any type of phased investment shall fit this 
category. For example, most factories can be constructed in several phases: a scheme 
design phase, a detailed engineering phase, and finally a construction phase. Product 
development programmes are another example. Usually they have a phase of 
development, a phase of market test, and then a phase of full-scale product launch.
Such compound options can be intuitively understood since real world investment 
decisions are generally made sequentially over time. Management must consider the 
possibility of subsequent decisions like suspending a project when an initial 
investment decision is made. A sequential option pricing technique aims to evaluate 
such a real investment. In a sense, the first option chronologically is the right to buy 
the second option.
Most of the existing references, regarding compounds options, belongs European type 
compound options study such as McDonald/Siegel (1985) created a contingent value 
price model for a firm which it allowed temporary or costless terminating a project 
and restarting at later stage. Sing (2002) studied “time to build options in construction 
processes”. The author analyzed manager’s prospects on the value of optimal trigger 
to construct a building. Even the studies of Majd/Pindyck (1985) and
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McDonald/Siegel (1985) are American type call option studies, they lack an empirical 
verification. The references still stay in the stage of theoretical development. However, 
developing a manager’s prospections to a real investment then formulise the 
prospections and the flexibilities of investment as a solvable ROA evaluation model 
still have a long way to go.
4.4 Development and Assumptions o f Employing ROA to the 
optimal trigger timing of OMRs
The aim of this section is to provide a preparation to subsequent model development. 
Thereby, this section will clearly introduce the options when issuers conduct OMRs. 
Further, the necessary assumptions of building up the optimal pricing model to OMRs 
will also be presented. This section aims to provide a preliminary to the following 
model derivation.
4.4.1 Relationship between ROA and OMRs- optimal trigger timing
Notwithstanding that we have introduced that OMRs has a very similar characteristic 
to investment projects and are subject to similar flexibilities, to link the options of
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executing OMRs with ROA, people need to know in practice how this works in a
repurchase strategy.
Operating OMRs is the same as general investors trading shares in the open market. 
The deferral option occurs at the beginning day of repurchasing if issuers do not 
execute their repurchase rights immediately. Issuers initially start their first time 
repurchase activity and can proceed to complete this activity. The issuers could also 
postpone their repurchase activity and wait for the market response before deciding 
their next repurchase activity or they can wait for the next repurchase when conditions 
are more favourable. Meanwhile, the deferral option appears again until issuers see 
the next trigger. Such a repurchase strategy is repeated continuously until the expiry 
of the authorized repurchase programme. To sum up, when the total buyback volume 
is less than the announced buyback volume, the option to contract exists. Or we can 
say that such issuers can abandon their repurchase right before the expiry. 
Furthermore, as regards the differences between the option to deferral and the option 
to abandon, these are difficult to distinguish.
The value of a deferral option arises from the possibility of better investment 
conditions in the future, such that waiting with the investment decision is beneficial.
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OMRs is a non-commitment investment strategy; the contingent value will vanish as 
long as the investment opportunity is gone. Furthermore, to assume that the future 
stock price has a foreseeable pattern is unrealistic. Therefore, executing OMRs 
incorporates the option to defer repurchase activities, however the option to defer has 
no intrinsic value once the trigging timing is expired. Moreover, the flexibilities of 
OMRs includes an authorized right to buyback the outstanding shares. As long as 
issuers give up the right, option to abandon, then the authorized rights will vanish and 
the derived contingent value from an ex ante authorized option becomes worthless.
There is no study incorporating ROA into the appraisal of the optimal trigger timing 
of OMRs up-to-date. We turn to this study to focus on the optimal trigger timing since 
it is the most concerning question to an issuer whether to decide to launch OMRs. 
ROA has an advantage over the traditional financial option pricing technique in that it 
is able to provide the result of optimal trigger timing (as illustrated in section 4.2). 
The most important questions to issuers are (i) how much the issuer needs to pay for 
buying back outstanding shares and (ii) how many shares they need to repurchase in 
order to reach the maximum profit under the price condition and volume condition. 
Thus, the following chapter aims to use OMRs to create a sequential optimal trigger 
timing model.
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The optimal trigger point is defined as when the diffusion of the contingent value of 
share repurchases are tangent at the point between an issuer’s expected return. The 
contingent revenue that issuers can have is the price difference/asymmetry payoff 
between a company’s fundamental value and market price. The total contingent 
value is decided by how much the price difference can be saved multiplied by the 
repurchase volume..
4.4.2 M odel Assumptions
Prior to the formal derivation of optimal trigger timing to OMRs, it is important to 
setup the assumptions of model development and our research aims. Furthermore, 
several assumptions with respect to modeling requirements need to be declared, 
especially, the type of contingent value, underlying asset(s), transaction characteristics 
and trading volume consideration.
Firstly, OMRs are not a firm commitment and any pre-announced plan can be 
abandoned before the predicted expiry date. Therefore, it has been asserted that
OMRs is a type of American option because the share repurchase can be ceased 
before the expiry.
As regards the strike price issue, despite an issuer knowing the fundamental value, 
he/she still relies on the current market price and market response in order to decide 
its strike price instead of taking self quotations. In addition, share repurchases are not 
similar to other financial derivatives transaction that requires documentary quotations. 
Therefore, there is no indicative strike price in a repurchase plan or in an executive 
period. All issuer’s quotations depend on uncertain market price changes and the 
responses from other investors.
Since the option value of OMRs is contingent on the asymmetry payoff between 
fundamental and market share price, naturally it can be formed as an exchange option. 
Issuers always seek the optimal trigger timing to repurchase their outstanding shares to create 
the maximum profit to their long-term shareholders. Besides, both underlying assets are 
interactive in the relationship of covariance.
The importance of the trading volume with respect to influencing the share price 
transaction has been documented (Epps, 1977; Tse/Devos, 2004; Fairchild and Zhang,
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2005). Most contingent value references ignored this endogenous variable to simplify 
their studies. To link this study closely to reality, it is first assumed that the optimal 
repurchase volume will be given to start up mu* fundamental model setup. Then this 
fundamental model will be further extended to derive a more advanced model, where 
the trading volume is also one of the variables.
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Chapter 5 
A real options model of 
share repurchase timing
Although the flexibilities of executing OMRs include the option to deferral and the 
option to abandon, our study aims to provide the investment information for the best 
investment timing as well as investment volume since these are of utmost concern for 
investors. By doing this, issuers/ users of our created models need only focus on the 
optimal trigger timing, so that they are able to create the maximum profit for their 
long-term shareholders.
In section 5.1, we introduce a one-time repurchase model. The one-time optimal 
repurchase timing model under given repurchase volume model and one-time optimal
repurchase timing model with optimal given repurchase volume are provided. In 
section 5.2, we delve into the extensive sequential repurchase price model under given 
repurchase volume model. Section 5.3 will introduce the hypothesis for further 
empirical investigation and the process of employing the developed models for the 
practical application. Finally, section 5.4 will address the limitations of our model 
development and application. The contents of this chapter include assumptions of 
model development, model setup, solution process, and how to implement the 
creation of the final model so as to compare our findings against existing literature.
5.1 Single share repurchase
5.1.1 Assumptions o f  model development
The value of OMRs options is contingent on the asymmetry payoff between
fundamental value ( V ) and market share price (P).  Let us consider a firm with a
fixed number of N  outstanding shares whose net assets have a fundamental value of
MM  such that the fundamental value of a single share is V -  — . It is assumed that
N
this fundamental value, follows a simple Brown-Wiener process in continuous time:
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where dzA is a standard Brown-Wiener process.
The market price can deviate from this net asset value due to the presence of noise
5
traders whose relative net demand — is purely stochastic:
N
■“  = ° s dzs (5-2)
where dzs is a standard Brown-Wiener process, independent of dzA . With a market
liquidity of A the market price P follows:
dP dV J S  d(\nP ) « —  = —  + A —  
P V
= fiAdt + <JAdzA + Aasdzs (5-3)
= HAdt + <jpdZf
where = Oy + X2a^ and dzp is another Brown-Wiener process.
5.7. 2 Derivation o f  model
1. Given the repurchase volume
Recall that in this model the motivation for launching OMRs is trying exploit the 
undervaluation of the company and derive the optimal timing for such an action. 
Therefore, the contingent value of executing OMRs is the price difference between
the fundamental value and market share price. Mathematically, the returns from
V Vexecuting OMRs can be represented as In—. Hereafter, this is denoted as g = In—,
where g  is a real function representing the joint underlying assets V and P.
Thus, by totally differentiating g , we can get Eq. (5-4).
dg = V  = V -'dV -p-'dP  = Xasdz (5-4)
z dx
An OMRs investment opportunity is contingent on the variable g , denoted as F(g), 
and this yields no cash flows up till the time of exercise when the investment is 
undertaken. Otherwise, the only return from holding it is its capital appreciation. 
Hence in the continuous region, the above exercise strategy can be written as Eq. 
(5-5).
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pFdT = s(dF)6 (5-5)
p : expected rate of capital appreciation
Eq. (5-5) is the Bellman’s Principle of Optimality which indicates that over a time 
interval d t , the total expected return on the investment opportunity, pFdt , is equal to 
its expected rate of capital appreciation. Then dF is expanded by ordinary 
derivation, and the optimal contingent value function can be presented as follows:
F : is the second differential of F
Eq. (5-6) is a stochastic ordinary differential equation without considering the 
influence of time factor. Eq. (5-6), as with Eq. (4-5), also has many solutions that 
correspond to all the different derivations that can be defined with g  as the 
underlying variable. The particular derivative obtained when the equation is solved 
depends on the boundary conditions that are used. These specify the values of the
(5-6)
where
6 We disregard the sub-notations for simplicity of notation
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derivative at the boundaries of possible values of g . In the case of share repurchases 
take place in one time period, the key boundary condition that we can observe is the 
payoff from exercising the option at time T . The expected profits from the 
repurchase of a given amount, Q, of the outstanding number of shares with a 
liquidity X of the market are given by
F(g) = F{V,P) = N l'\)n V T-\nPTyin (5-7)
Refining Eq. (5-7), this can be written as
F( g)  = F{V ,P) = Q N U nV - l n P - U e j o r  Qn ( S - U g (5-8)
As in American option pricing problems of this sort, there will be a trigger value, g *,
that the issuers will exercise the option to repurchase their outstanding shares to create
the maximal profit for their shareholders.
(  * 1 ^Upon exercise, issuers will receive a net payoff QN g* — XQ . As the option has
V . 2
not been exercised, its value is positive at any point of time before its exercise. We 
can immediately derive that and deduce that g* >^XQ>  0. Eq. (5-9), high contact
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condition, ensures that the trigger is optimal.
F! (g)  = F! (V,P)  = QN (5-9)
Final boundary conditions are imposed:
lim F '(g) = 0 7 (5-10)
This is the result of the fact that if the market share price goes to an infinite value or 
the fundamental value ever reaches zero, then the repurchase programme will never 
be exercised and it will become worthless. A real options model of one-time share 
repurchase timing, starting from Eq. (5-6) to Eq. (5-10) has been constructed.
5.1.3 Solutions o f  Process and Results
Eq. (5-6) is a standard ordinary differential equation which has a general solution of
F  (g) = Axe^s + . (5-11)
7 lim F (g )  = 0 has two scenarios which are l im F (F ,P )  = 0 or lim P (F ,P )  = 0.
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The general solution, Eq. (5-11), of the optimal one-time repurchase model is 
different from the general solution of Eq. (4-5), Eq. (4-9). Eq. (4-5) is a homogeneous 
ordinary equation with variable coefficients; it is a type of Euler equation. Hence, the 
general solution is a polynomial function. However, Eq. (5-6) is a standard ordinary 
equation with the characteristics of non-repeat to zero solution, so that its general 
solution is a type of exponential function (Giordano/ Weir; 1991).
The contingent value F (g )a lso  has to satisfy the boundary condition (5-10). 
Therefore, the second part of general solution cannot be satisfied. The remaining 
general solution of Eq. (5-6) remains the first part of Eq. (5-11) eventually. We write it 
as follows:
F = Axe‘^  (5-12)
Then, by an ordinary calculus, to solve the optimal one-time repurchase model,
including diffusion equation Eq. (5-6), boundary equations Eq. (5-7) and Eq. (5-9) ,
and the high contact equation, the following results can be obtained: 
pr~
f3 -  ——  (the negative item is ruled out) (5-13)
Act,
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and the coefficient of the general solution is
 ^ = & L e-p{s) = Q?Le \ xpQ-x (5-16)
Substituting Eq. (5-14), Eq. (5-16) into Eq. (5-12), the value of the repurchase option 
for a fixed repurchase amount Q is given by
value and — is the term of adjust for the value of waiting. It confirms the initial 
remark that the optimal trigger value has to exceed ~ A Q . It also demonstrates that 
the deterministic method is inappropriate for the estimation of an investment under 
uncertain circumstances. The optimal trigger timing to OMRs calculated by option 
pricing technique is higher than the trigger value derived by the deterministic pricing
(5-17)
Eq. (5-14) includes two components: —AQ represents the deterministic NPV trigger
technique. Financially, we interpret this phenomenon as issuers not rushing to trigger 
their repurchase activity. They will wait longer to have a clearer picture of the 
uncertain phenomenon than to trigger their repurchase activity, so as to create the 
maximum profit for their long term shareholders. The complete model derivation and 
solution process are presented in the Appendix B.
Optimal repurchase volume
Eq. (5-8) is a derived expected revenue function with the assumption of a given 
repurchase amount. Depending on Eq. (5-8), we can further derive the optimal 
repurchase volume.
Differentiating Eq. (5-8) by Q to get the optimal repurchase volume, 0* is equal to
o
—. We then follow the previous solution procedure to solve the optimal trigger timing 
A
with optimal trigger volume in a one-time repurchase model. The following optimal 
trigger timing results can be obtained:




Substituting Eq. (5-18) into Eq. (5-19) and Q* =— into Eq. (5-12), the value of the
X
repurchase option for a optimal repurchase amount Q* is given by
(5-20)
5.1.4 Discussion o f  results
In this section discuss the results intuitively and interpret the outcomes as well as any 
shortcomings/problems, one being the restriction to a single repurchase, which gives 
you the link to the following section
To verify the accuracy and rationality of the one-time repurchase model, we conduct a 
numerical analysis with the parameter setting as follows: annual risk free rate, p , is 
ranges from 0.001 to 0.2; liquidity parameter, X , is 0.25; total issue shares, N , is 
18,000,000; the standard deviation of rate of return, <rs , ranges from O.Olto 0.5; and 
repurchase volume, Q , ranges from 0.001 to 0.1.
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The results obtained by the optimal OMRs contingent value pricing model are 
presented in the following Figures 5-1 to 5-3, and these are consistent with the 
demonstrations in chapter 4.
The repurchase volume, Q , has a positive relationship with the optimal trigger value, 
g *; The standard deviation of return, crs , has a positive relationship with the 
optimal trigger value, g*; The interest rate , p , has a negative relationship with the 
optimal trigger value, g  . The results produced by numerical analysis are 
reasonable and consistent with capital investment theory. In other words, a bigger 
investment risk combines a higher trigger point to yield a better contingent value; and 
a bigger risk free rate combines a bigger waiting cost so that issuers have to trigger 
earlier.
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Figure5-2 Trigger value as a function of the repurchase volume and liquidity
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Figure5-3 Trigger value as a function of the repurchase amount and interest rates
Except for the above numerical illustration on the optimal trigger timing result, we 
can also depend on the auxiliary mathematical techniques to verify our numerical 
illustration. The partial derivatives of the option value have the following properties:
1. ^ L > 0  and ^ 1>0
d a  d a
2. ^ < 0  and ^ - < 0
d p  d p
3. ^ > 0  
SQ
The details of mathematical proofs are presented at the Appendix C.
However, the real options model of one-time share repurchase timing exposes some
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drawbacks. For example, the one-time repurchase model cannot explain the realistic 
operation of OMRs which are conducted sequentially. Secondly, the one-time 
repurchase model has assumed that the repurchase action has no impact on the market 
price. Issuers take the whole risk to buy the shares and expect that the market price 
can revert to the issuers’ expected prices. Based on the hypothesis that OMRs is a tool 
of investment (Vermaelen, 1981; 1984) and the hypothesis support for the share price 
(Ikenberry/Vermaelen, 1996), the one-time repurchase model fails to reveal that share 
repurchase programmes are able to generate a short term abnormal positive return/ or 
to salvage the undervalued share price. Therefore, there is a need to derive the 
sequential repurchase model.
5.2 Multiple share repurchases
This section will extend the one-time repurchase model to that of an optimal multiple 
sequential contingent value pricing model for OMRs. This extensive model 
development aims to derive a sequential repurchase model which is close to practical 
operations. Here, the issuers’ trigger is at the optimal trigger timing while the 
repurchase volume is assumed to be fixed.
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5.2.1 Assumptions o f  the model
OMRs are irreversible share buyback investment. Every trigger OMRs and cessation 
of the share buyback strategy incurs no extra cost because there is no threshold cost to 
enter OMRs and there is also no loss in ceasing the repurchase programme. Therefore, 
we can declare OMRs to be a sequential repurchase model with characteristics of 
irreversible investment, capacity choice, free threshold and free re-entry cost of 
capital investment programme.
To satisfy the volume condition, we assume that there is a fixed rate at which outlays 
and repurchase can proceed, q is the fixed rate at which the firm can purchase in a 
small time interval, q satisfies the constraint of permitted daily repurchase volume 
and the summed up q in each time period is small and equals to the total announced 
repurchase amount.
The repurchase mechanism, is such that when issuers decide to execute the repurchase 
programme, they repurchase periodically. However, if the future market price 
increases to reach their expected value, they suspend their repurchase activity. 
However, if the future market price continues to fall to a sufficiently low price, issuers
77
can suspend the programme, until the market price starts to rise later, during which 
the issuer can resume stock repurchase at the point it previously left off.
In order to capture the above market share price change in the share buyback strategy, 
we need to employ a new variable ,k ,  to assist our model setup, k is the total 
remaining expenditure required to complete the project. The dynamics of k are 
given by
dk = -qdt (5-21)
We therefore have two state variables that affect the optimal investment decision. The 
first is the remaining repurchase surplus to continue to proceed to the next repurchase, 
k . When k is equal to zero, it implies that the whole buyback programme is 
completed. The second is the asymmetry payoff price difference between the 
fundamental value and the market price, gs , in the sequential repurchase model.
In this model, the firm’s repurchase action, drj, is assumed to be effective in 
salvaging the undervalued market price. The market price follows a dynamic 
geometric Brown-Wiener process with the shock of share repurchases after first-time
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repurchase activity.9
= fjydt + <Jvdzv + Xasdzs + Adrj 
= J2ydt + <jpdzp + Xdij
(5-22)
where
R : represents total repurchase portion and it is equal to qN 
drj = qdt
If the share repurchase is temporarily stopped, then drj = 0. We neglect the increase 
in the firm value due to buying undervalued shares as the amount is small relative to 
the value of the company.
Besides, the fundamental value is the same as Eq. (5-1), which follows a simple 
Brown-Wiener process.
9 The instantaneous market price change in the first time of sequential OMRs is the same as the change 
in the one-time repurchase model because there is only the disturbance of noise traders in the first 
time trigger. Besides, the issuer’s repurchase is assumed to effectively salvage the undervalued price, 
so that the price dynamics has to take into account the issuers’ efforts on repurchasing from now 
on.
dg = -Xqdt + X<Jsdz (5-23)
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Because there are no adjustment costs or other costs associated with changing the rate 
of investment, the optimal rate of investment will be either 0 or q .
As always, the firm has an option to invest that it may or may not exercise. We will 
denote F (g ,k )  as the value of this option, assuming it is exercised optimally, that is, 
assuming that the firm follows the optimal investment rule by repurchasing stock 
when g<g*, and not repurchasing otherwise. Then, as in the earlier section, we will 
find F [g ,k ) and obtain the critical value of g* (&) as part of the solution. We can 
do this using dynamic programming.
5.2.2 Derivation o f  model results
As the explanation stated, two questions of interest to issuers are: firstly, what is the 
best price to trigger OMRs and how many shares they have to buy back when the 
OMRs is undertaken. To derive this optimal model, the two-dimension Taylor 
expansion and Ito’s Lemma have to be employed. The optimal contingent value of 
OMSR is derived in the following Eq. (5-24). The details of the derivation of the 
diffusion process of the sequential repurchase model are presented in Appendix D.
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U 2<?,FB-KiFt -qFK-pF = 0 (5-24)
As introduced in the previous section, k represents the remaining portion of stock to 
be repurchased. qFK captures exactly the meaning of sequential 
repurchases/investment because the unrealized contingent value is equal to the 
marginal unfinished repurchase portion times the repurchase volume in that period. 
Mathematically, Eq. (5-18) is a partial differential equation, PDE, with given constant 
coefficients. There is no specific general solution to such kinds of partial differential 
equation. To solve the optimal contingent evaluation model, we need the extra 
conditions to define the stochastic diffusion of sequential repurchases.
There are three conditions to be taken into account: one of the conditions is an initial 
condition, which relates to the remaining repurchase portion, k . The other two 
conditions, which are boundary conditions, are about the asymmetry payoff, g . The 
first boundary condition we consider with respect to the trigger value is the same as 
Eq. (5-10). The second boundary condition which we consider with respect to the 
upper bound of trigger value, is as shown in Eq. (5-25). This condition is formulated 
by considering the rule of the details of open market stock issue. There is usually a
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limit to the lowest price of a company. When the stock is undervalued too much 
(larger than the threshold) it faces a take-over threat, B (g ) is then the profits the 
company makes from this take-over, which we assume to be constant, by our notation.
Next, regarding the initial condition, we consider that when K  is equal to zero, then 
there is no option value that exists because the whole repurchase programme has been 
completed.
Employing the variable separation method to solve the general solution to Eq. (5-24), 
we can get the general solution of the optimal contingent value evaluation model. The 
details of the general solution of sequential repurchase model are presented in the 
Appendix E:
Boundary condition: F  (g, .£) = 2? (g ) (5-25)
Initial condition: F (g ,0) = 0 (5-26)







Eq. (5-27) and Eq. (5-28) reveal an unexpected result at first glance. The 
un-repurchased share has no influence on the general solution of the sequential 
repurchase model with respect to the remaining share repurchase activity. We can 
conclude two potential reasons upon further analysis: First, there is no extra
adjustment cost with respect to the repurchase volume at each stage. It is constant 
irregardless of the cost per share. As regards the average repurchase portion, q , is 
employed because the open market is an uncertain market. Taking the average the 
repurchase portion helps eliminate the risk of non-constant repurchase volume. The 
concept is the same as that of the least square method which reduces the estimation 
error. Both reasons lead to an independent repurchase activity at each stage, thus the 
un-repurchased portion, k ,  has no effect on the contingent value in a sequential 
repurchase process.
As regards the boundary conditions for optimization purposes, the value-matching 
condition and smooth-pasting condition are required to find the critical point as well.
To realize the issuers’ expected sequential revenue, we need the condition of the
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revenue function to be tangent with the diffusion curve at each time period. When the 
tangent point is found, then we can be assured that the optimal trigger point for 
sequential repurchase model is found.
The derivation of expected revenue function is derived as follows. The repurchase 
time is divided into n subintervals of equal length. Hence, the expected revenue 
function at the first stage is derived as follows: 
l st-stage:
Xi =Q + N ^ * { \n V l - \R l* ) d T i  = qN g s - n x - ^ A q ^  = qN
2x1
The repurchase activity is assumed to effectively salvage the undervalued market 
price. Based on the theory of Martingale property, the expected trigger value at the 
second stage is equal to the expected trigger value at the first stage which deduces the 
shock of the second time repurchase influence in the second stage.
The expected revenue function at the second stage is derived as follows: 
itb-stage:
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Inferring the issuer’s expected revenue to the nth-stage:
K n ~ qN
(n-\)Xq Xq \  (  Aq8-^ r -+u\=qN{s-Tn (5-29)
As regards the boundary conditions for optimization purposes, the value-matching
condition and smooth-pasting condition are required to find the critical point as well.
Finally, we need a smooth-pasting condition which we obtain from the 
value-matching condition above as follows:
* , { g 'T ) = W  (5-30)
5.2,3 Solutions o f  Process and Results
We can solve the partial differential equation under the imposed boundary conditions
of Eqs. (5-29), (5-30) and (5-10) and using the general solution for Eq. (5-27).
Differentiating Eq. (5-21) by g  and defining g* as the point tangent with the n* 
expected revenue function, we can generate the coefficient of general solution 5 (g )  
as follows:
B ( g )  (5-31)
ro/"*8-8*
Substituting Eq. (5-31) into Eq. (5-27) and equating the final equation to the nth
expected revenue function, we obtain the optimal trigger value of the n expected 
revenue function.




* 1 / 1  q
S s  =  —  +  —  mj 2 n
(5-32)
F " ( g \ K )  = 3 K
v ' ' mt
(5-33)
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Finally, we substitute Eq. (5-31) and (5-32) into Eq. (5-27), and arrive at the general 




Eq. (5-31) is similar to the solved optimal trigger timing, Eq. (5-14), of the one-time 
repurchase model; the optimal trigger value has to exceed and it is consistent
with the previous demonstration of the deterministic method which is inappropriate 
for the estimation of an investment under uncertain circumstances. However, there is 
a difference between Eq. (5-28) and Eq. (5-13) which lies in the parameters m and 
P . This is due to the effect of the repurchase on prices and thus on the profits of 
future repurchases. In other words, repurchase activity is assumed to effectively 
exploit the undervaluation of the shares through its optimal timing. As a consequence 
of the repurchase activity the difference between fundamental value and market price 
reduces gradually. The theoretical optimal value in a sequentially repurchase model is 
getting smaller. Eq. (5-32) just explains this theoretical expectation. More clear 
numerical illustrations are presented as follows under the discussion of results.
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5.2.4 Discussion o f  results
The optimal solution reveals the same result that optimal trigger timing and optimal
contingent value do not appear to depend on k ; it depends on the maximum
repurchase rate q at each time interval only. However, there is a slight relationship
between k and q . Before issuers take any repurchase activity, k is equal to the
intended buyback volume, and q is equal to —. The relationship is built on here.
n
Having now established the optimal trigger timing model and contingent value of the 
option to repurchase stocks, we can now continue our sensitivity analysis to determine 
the optimal trigger value g at which the option is to be exercised.
As is obvious from the inspection of Eq. (5-26) above, the trigger value is a linear 
combination which increases with the liquidity of the market, as confirmed in 
Figure-5-1. Intuitively we would expect the trigger value to increase in the repurchase 
amount as the larger repurchase would drive up the price, thus decreasing the profits 
available. Inspection of Figure- 5-4 proves the above expectation.
LAMBDA 0 0 Q
Figure 5-4 Trigger value as a function of the repurchase volume and liquidity
We can explain this finding by considering the profits the company would make from 
the repurchase as defined by its objective function10. When repurchasing a small 
amount, the profits will be relatively small. Thus, when the values differ only 
marginally, it is beneficial to wait for a larger difference as this would translate to a 
higher profit. As the repurchase amount increases, the profits also increase 
accordingly, thus the incentives to conduct a repurchase also increase. It can actually 
be shown that the profits from the repurchase are strictly increasing in the repurchase 
amount. As the repurchase amount increases, the price effect of the transaction will 
become more and more important until it finally dominates and the trigger value 
increases.
1 0  W e  t h a n k  R i c h a r d  F a i r c h i l d  f o r  p r o v i d i n g  u s  w i t h  s o m e  i n s i g h t s  i n t o  t h i s  r e l a t i o n s h i p
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The explanation of volatility in Figure 5-5 is the same as the explanation in the 
one-time repurchase model. The influence of the repurchase amount is the same as the 
explanation in Figure 5-4. We would not repeat it here.
Figure 5-6 reveals the relationship amongst optimal trigger value, repurchase amount, 
and interest rates. This figure reveals that the interest rate has a negative non-linear 
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Figure5-5 Trigger value as a function of the repurchase volume and variance of return
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Figure 5-6 Trigger value as a function of the repurchase volume and the interest rate
5.3 E m p irica l im plica tion s
The next chapter will conduct an empirical investigation. This empirical study aims to 
further test the validity of the developed optimal trigger timing models using real data. 
With this confirmatory study, we can then use our optimal trigger models to criticize 
practical OMRs’ operative performance. The empirical implication starts with a 
hypothesis test on both the one-time repurchase model and sequential repurchase 
model. Then the comparison between practical repurchase performance and 
theoretical optimal trigger timing will be undertaken.
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5.3.1 One time repurchase model:
Hypothesis 1: The optimal trigger timing has a positive relationship with the standard 
deviation o f return, <j s . A bigger repurchase volumeresults ins a higher trigger point. 
This hypothesis aims to verify that, if a company’s share return is volatile, then the 
issuer would not rush to trigger their repurchase activity. Their repurchase strategy is 
to wait longer for the appropriate time to capture higher returns for their long-term 
shareholders..
5.3.2 Sequential repurchase model:
Hypothesis 2: With multiple repurchases, the threshold for conducting OMRs is higher 
for the first repurchase than for subsequent repurchases.
In an incomplete market, the price of goods will change when a new market 
participant enters. This price change results from demand -supply changes. After that, 
the new equivalent point will stabilise. The further market price will not change 
sharply as long as no new market participant enters. Our sequential repurchase 
behavior assumes similar economic behaviour. Before the first-time trigger, the 
market has not experienced a repurchase impact. When the first -time trigger takes
place, the market participants change so that the price difference changes as well. But 
the further repurchase activity will not change the price difference dramatically. Thus, 
there should be a kink between first time trigger and the second time trigger.
Hypothesis 3: The repurchase acvtivities are timed such that they generate profits for 
the company which are reflected in a higher stock price after the repurchase.
This is an important assumption in the sequential repurchase model. However, from 
the numerical analysis in the Section 5-2, the small repurchase volume is not the case. 
This hypothesis aims to confirm the validity of numerical analysis in Section 5-2.
5.4 Limitations of the developed models
This study pioneers to develop the optimal trigger timing and optimal volume models 
to issuers of OMRs. There are several limitations which challenge our research results. 
First of all, OMRs are embodied as a non-commitment repurchase programme so it is 
difficult to evaluate the total contingent value of executing OMRs. The second 
limitation is that it is difficult to evaluate the signalling effect. The final limitation is 
the concern with respect to the mathematical technique used for the model setup and 
solution processes.
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As regards the first limitations, OMRs is not an obligation to invest. Companies hold 
the rights to repurchase but have no obligation to complete the pre-announced 
repurchase programme. The flexibilities of OMRs makes it difficult to accurately 
evaluate other documented revenues with respect to an uncertain repurchase volume 
and repurchase price. This limitation results in the sequential model being unable to 
accurately evaluate the total investment cost and the contingent value from the 
execution of OMRs.
With respect to the signalling effect of OMRs, Ikenberry/ Vermaelen (1996) and 
McNally (1999) pointed out that the explanatory variables to signalling OMRs 
include company size, reputation, economic growth, returns etc. and that they are able 
to influence the magnitude of signalling effect. In other words, the signalling effect 
could vary between companies. Even the same company could have different 
signalling effects in different time frames so that it is hard to accurately evaluate its 
contribution into our developed model.
Finally, we assume that executing OMRs is unlimited time so that the time value of 
the contingent value of OMRs is ignored. Further study can develop an option with a
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maturity time frame thus incorporating time effect into the optimal trigger timing 
models. However, this requires a more complicated mathematical technique and more 
boundary conditions to assist the derivation of the optimal repurchase trigger timing 
model. Unfortunately, it is hard to provide boundary conditions to this type of model. 





A company’s fundamental value is an important parameter with respect to the 
developed optimal trigger timing models. Ikenberry/Vermalen (1996) and this study 
declared that fundamental value determines the options values of OMRs. It is also a 
parameter to test whether the operations are practical to an empirical study. In the 
theory of optimality, it is a factor to decide the optimal trigger price of OMRs. In 
other words, it is not only a parameter for the estimation of optimal trigger timing but 
it is also a parameter to test whether the operation is optimally practical. Prior to 
undertaking this empirical investigation, the estimation of fundamental value will be 
introduced. Once the estimation of a company’s fundamental value has been studied,
then the following empirical investigation can be undertaken.
We test the developed models and practical verification with the hypotheses
mentioned in Chapter 5 in this chapter. The investigated companies are a sample
selection from a single industrial sector (information technology). We conduct
descriptive statistics aimed at important parameters and then prepare the data for
further extensive study uses and conduct several simple analyses for practical OMRs
operations. Next, we substitute input parameters into the developed models to analyse
the theoretically optimal trigger timing and to analyse the differences among different
optimal trigger timing models of OMRs. Furthermore, by analyzing the difference
between theoretical and practical trigger timings, we will provide the optimal
repurchase strategy for practical operation purposes which will be recommended at
the end of this section. This empirical investigation aims not only to verify the
accuracy and applicability of the developed models but also to provide
recommendations to conduct OMRs for purposes of practical operations and to
respond to arguments in the existing literature.
*
In Section 6.2, we introduce fundamental value analysis. In Section 6.3, we examine 
the sampled companies data that affects the decision to initiate a share repurchase.
Section 6-4 undertakes the analysis of real options models of share repurchase timing. 
Here we also conduct a series of tests relating to both the theoretical optimal 
repurchase strategy and practical operations. Section 6-5 details a final summary of 
our empirical study. Section 6-6 provides a critical analysis on this empirical study.
6.2 Estimation approach o f fundamental value
There are two different estimation methods which will be employed to estimate the 
fundamental value; one is the practical method and the other is derived by the capital 
pricing theory. With the objective and accurate fundamental value appraisal methods, 
we are able to transform the practical operation into a testable index.
6.2.1 Practical estimation method
The first method is widely used in financial practices Taiwan. This method multiplies 
the financial index of price-eamings ratio by the earnings per-share of a firm. 
Mathematically, this can be represented as
V = — xEPS (6-1)
E
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— : price to earnings ratio 
E P S : earning per share
The price to earnings ratio assumes that the corporation will be worth some multiple 
of its future earnings. A higher price to earnings ratio is often associated with growth 
stocks, or companies that are growing faster than average. It is a well used indicator to 
assist analysts in the estimation of a company’s value. (Value Based Management.net, 
2005). In line with common business practice in Taiwan, we assume that a firm’s 
fundamental value in 2004 is equal to its price to earnings ratio averaged over 2004 
multiplied by the forecast of their 2004 earnings per share. However, the estimation of 
Eq. (6-1) is easily manipulated by a volatile financial index. To avoid using an 
improper and too sensitive an index the data of which could be too sensitive for the 
evaluation of fundamental value, we adopt the average past four years 
price-to-eamings ratio to moderate any single year abnormal data.
Taking price-eamings ratio of an index instead of a single company offers a different 
explanation. If their price earnings ratios are below the industry average, issuers 
believe that their companies are undervalued. Issuers also believe that their 
cumulative value is worthier than the current market price. Therefore, taking the
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average price to earnings index multiplied by the 2004 earnings per share can take 
their past accumulated average performance and future prospective earnings into 
account.
6.2,2 Theoretical estimation method
The second method of estimating fundamental value is based on stock valuation 
theory. The stock price of an investment can be derived as follows:
Where
r : expected growth return on the stock investment of one time period, (expected 
capitialisation rate)
D ,: flow payoff (dividend)
The current stock price is equal to the expected stock price in next period plus flow 
payoff (dividend to shareholders) -which discounts for time. Assuming the flow 
return is permanent with a growth rate of c , and assumed to hold the stock
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permanently, we then can rewrite the above stock evaluation formula as Eq. (6-2)
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Eq. (6.3) is the famous stock pricing model, the Gordon formula. In that model, the 
market asset price is assumed to be equal to the fundamental value of the asset so that 
the market price is equal to its fundamental value. However, this hypothesis of 
efficient market is unsuitable for our study purposes because the market price is 
undervalued in a bear market (Craine, 2005), so that a company’s fundamental value 
will not be equal to its outstanding share price. In other words, dividend is irrelevant 
to the estimation of fundamental value in the inefficient / imperfect market.
To have the objective estimation method of fundamental value, we employ the 
principle of Eq.(6-3) and change the required variables to be as follows:
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A company’s fundamental value is based on a company’s future (discounted) cash 
flow.The net earning growth return of assets, H - c ,  represents a firm’s ability to 
grow (earning growth return of assets minus the potentially payout ratio). Taking 
EPS divided by net earning growth return of assets, the fundamental value can be 
obtained. In order to derive this formula we replace dividends in equation (6-3) by 
EPS, which can be justified by the Modigliani-Miller hypothesis on the irrelevance of 
dividends.
The arguments to employ EPS instead of adopting dividend in Eq. (6-4) include: 
First, dividend represents the flow payoff of investing in a stock, and EPS 
represents the operation profit of an asset. Using EPS to estimate a company’s 
fundamental value is thus reasonable. In addition, using dividends to estimate a 
company’s fundamental value is far-fetched because any dividend issue relates to a 
company’s disposable money distribution method to its shareholder. Employing this 
index to estimate a company’s fundamental value might create bias in the estimation 
of a company’s fundamental value. Hence, we employ EPS to estimate a company’s 
fundamental value.
The EPS employed here is the financial index of 2004 earnings per share. To avoid 
volatile financial statistics, H  is the average past four years growth return of total 
assets. Taking the index of average rate of return of total assets instead of a single year 
index can avoid the volatile index in a single year, so as to increase the accuracy of 
the estimated fundamental value.
6.3 Data description
6.3.1 Sample selection
Our developed models aim to create an optimal trigger timing models for issuers, so 
as to assist them to reach maximum profit for their long-term shareholders. Therefore, 
all the sampled companies in the empirical investigation have to launch their 
repurchase programmes for the purpose of investment as they repurchase outstanding 
shares with the aim of maintaining a company’s credit worthiness and their 
shareholder wealth.
The sampled companies in this empirical study are those companies sampled within 
the FTSE Taiwan 50. The index of FTSE Taiwan 50 is calculated by the average
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weighted 50 public companies. The total value of these companies is over 70% of the 
aggregate Taiwan market capitalization. It is one of the most representative economic 
indices in Taiwan. FTSE Taiwan 50 is comprised eleven industries which include 
Electronics, Banking and Insurance, Plastics, Telecom, Textile, Steel Structure, Food, 
Motor, Merchandise, Transportation, and Others.
The Taiwanese electronics industry (or IT industry) is the most representative industry. 
The product value of Taiwan IT industry is over 8% of Taiwan GDP and over 46% of 
IT accessories were exported from Taiwan in 2003. The market capitalisation of the 
IT industry is over 57.51% which is over half the market capitalization of the FTSE 
Taiwan 50 (see Figure 6-1). The majority of these electronics companies have 
executed OMRs, therefore, we will investigate the sampled Taiwanese Electronic 
companies among the FTSE Taiwan 50 in this study.
Based on the Taiwan Stock Exchange Corporate (TSEC) 2004 record, there are nine 
companies which executed OMRs. However, two of these companies have negative 
earnings per share and they are unsatisfactory for our purpose of empirical 
verification, so we have seven companies remaining which will be our investigative 










Electronics Plastics Textile Food Merchandise
T h i s  f i g u r e  s h o w s  t h e  d i s t r i b u t i o n  o f  t h e  i n d u s t r i a l  c a p i t a l i z a t i o n  o f  F T S E  T a i w a n  5 0  i n  2 0 0 4  
w h i c h  i s  m a i n l y  c a t a l o g u e d  a s  1 1  i n d u s t r i e s .  T h e  E l e c t r o n i c s  i n d u s t r y  o c c u p i e s  o v e r  h a l f  o f  
t h e  t o t a l  m a r k e t  c a p i t a l i s a t i o n  o f  F T S E  T a i w a n  5 0  ( S i n o P a c ,  2 0 0 4 ) .
Figure 6-1 The distribution of industrial capitalization of FTSE Taiwan 50
Their repurchase schedule concentrates on two periods that are end of March to end of 
May and the beginning of May to beginning of July for a total period of two months. 
During this period, there is a sharp decline around end of March and there is a further 
decline which broke through the 6000 point of the Taiwan weighted stock index. To 
maintain a company's creditworthiness and the rights of shareholders, our sampled 
companies executed OMRs to salvage the undervalued price. Some of these sampled 
companies executed their repurchase programmes more than once during 2004 such 
as UMC which executed OMRs twice in 2004. We select the first-time repurchase
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programme to form our empirical verification objective. Figure 6-2 shows the Taiwan 
weighted stock index in 2004; both repurchase periods are apparently during the bear 
market.
Period I Period n
This figure reveals two periods of stock recession in 2004 in Taiwan; one from end March and the 
other from the beginning of May. In the first time recession, Acer, Compal, TSMC, and UMC 
executed OMRs. MTK, Quanta and Realtek executed OMRs in the second time recession.
Figure 6-2 Taiwan weighted stock index in 2004
6.3.2 Data collection
To verify the validity of our study and conduct a practical comparison, the data 
collection task includes collecting: (i) the OMRs information of the sampled
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companies (ii) the data for the estimation of fundamental value and (iii) the input 
parameters for the application of our developed models. Our initial data collection 
of share buyback is obtained from TSEC and supplemented with details from the 
Taiwan Economic Journal Database, TEJD.
1. Data Collections of and the relative OMRs information of the sampled 
company
The task in this part includes collecting the basic information of a company and the 
realised repurchased information. The basic information includes the company’s name, 
the major industrial product and the total number of issued outstanding shares (N ),  
repurchase fraction (Q), and the average price during the repurchase period ( AP ).
The realized information includes the repurchase fractions/volume, repurchases 
frequency, average repurchase price (ARP)  and the average repurchase volume 
( ARV ). The realized information is pending our verification to determine if these 
companies have indeed repurchased their shares in a manner that is beneficial to 
shareholders.
2. Data Collections for estimating fundamental value
There are three parameters for estimating fundamental value: earnings per 
share ,E P S , the net growth rate of total assets, denoted as (H - c ), and the P/E  
ratio. To avoid the volatile single financial index which results in an unrealistic 
estimation, the net growth rate of total assets [ H - c )  adopted are those of the past 
four years average data; and P/E  represents the individual company’s average 
P/E  value in the past four years. EPS is taken from the 2004 record in 2004 on an 
after-tax basis. It is taken with an after tax adjustment. With respect to the net growth 
rate, H - p  is defined as per the previous section; H  is calculated from the 
average past four years growth rate of the total assets of the sampled companies.
3. Data Collections for Model Set-up
The required input variables for the empirical test for our one-time repurchase model 
include N, Q , p, <j s and X . Among the above parameters, N  and Q have 
been introduced in the aforementioned company’s information. The risk free rate, p, 
is the savings interest rate of the Bank of Taiwan as issued in 2004. The value of the 
standard deviation of the rate of return, is denoted as, a s . As regards market
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liquidity, A , we draw reference from Lin (2003) and take the statistics of a bear 
market because we assume that OMRs are executed in a bear market, especially, when 
issuers perceive OMRs as an investment tool and the bear market scenario is an 
appropriate time to execute such OMRs.
As regards the required input variables for the empirical test of the optimal sequential 
repurchases model, these are more complex than those of the one-time repurchase 
model. As mentioned in Chapter 5, there are another three input variables, repurchase 
frequency, the maximum repurchase rate in a time interval, and critical asymmetry 
payoff, which are required to be employed to calculate the theoretical optimal 
sequential repurchase timing. Among the above extra input variables, the critical 
asymmetry payoff, is calculated by taking the natural log of the critical pricing 
difference between fundamental value and market price; the buyback portion at each 
stage is assumed such that issuers repurchase a constant portion of outstanding shares 
which is equal to the ratio of the total repurchase portion over the repurchase 
frequency. It varies with each individual company’s buyback volume and buyback 
frequency. The final input parameters- repurchase frequency, is set by a company’s 
realised number of times of share repurchase.
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6.3.3 Descriptive statistics
The descriptive statistics aim to conduct a simple analysis on the practical operations 
where issuers’ average repurchase strategy such as repurchase price and repurchase 
volume will be analysed. Depending on the analysis of the average repurchase price 
and the repurchase volume, we can initially comment on their repurchase strategies. 
Besides, the index of the ratio of fundamental value divided by the average share 
price will also be discussed. Prior to analysing the above index, the fundamental value 
also has to be estimated.
1. Repurchases volume and repurchase price
Table 6-1 reveals that all investigated companies realised 3% below the number of 
shares to be repurchased. All the sampled companies repurchased a certain volume 
under the volume condition, which is no more than 10% of the total issued shares. 
Acer repurchased the maximum fraction of 2.583%, while Realtek repurchased the 
minimum fraction of 0.207%, as compared to the other sample companies.
Regarding repurchase price, in order to analyse the issuers’ performance of repurchase
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price, we employ another index -  the average share price during the repurchase period. 
Comparing the average share price and the average repurchase price, the average 
repurchase price of each company is below its individual average share price during 
the repurchase period. The average repurchase price is between 90% and 99% of its 
average share prices. This basic analysis is able to explain that the issuer’s repurchase 
strategy of buyback is intuitionally acceptable. In order to have a deeper 
understanding of practical OMRs operation, we will employ the traditional statistical 
method before beginning our series of discussions.
2. Fundamental Value
In order to estimate fundamental value, there are three parameters which need to be 
employed: price earning ratio, earning per share and net grow return of total asset. 
Table 6-1 shows that there is a different price earning ratio between different 
industrial sectors but there is a similar price earning ratio within the same industrial 
sub-sector. For instance, in the NB OEM sub-sector, Compal and Quanta have close 
price earning ratios of 11.02 and 13.31 respectively while TSMC and UMC also have 
close price earning ratios of 22.99 and 24.65 respectively in the IC design and 
semiconductor manufacturing sub-sector. A stock which has a higher price earning
Table 6-1 Basic Information of Sampled Companies
The following table provides summary information for open market share repurchase which includes the basic financial data and the relative data 
for the estimation of fundamental value, p  is the one-year savings interest rate published by the bank of Taiwan. The other variable is collected
from TSEC and TEJ.
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Acer Acer L td Computersystem 2315014 2.583% 49.11 7 49 0.172 0.369% 3.75 19.67 9.810% 73.7625 38.23
Compal CompalElectronics, Inc. NB 3338261 2.074% 40.39 7 38.93 0.19 0.296% 3.08 11.02 3.925% 33.9416 78.47
MTK Media Tek Inc IC design 769336 0.388% 283.43 2 274.7 0.189 0.194% 22.33 17.58 5.033% 392.5614 443.72
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IC design & 
Semiconductor 17791982 1.080% 30.13 8 27.1 0.189 0.135% 1.89 22.99 3.870% 43.4511 48.84
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ratio is often associated with growth stocks, or companies that are growing faster than 
average. This argument is also shown in Table 6-1 and it is consistent with practical 
expected industrial value. IC design and the manufacture of semiconductor are 
identified here as growth stocks as they have higher earnings ability compared to NB 
OEM.
Besides, all the sampled companies have a positive earning per share. Among them, 
MTK has the highest earning per share at 22.3. As regards the net growth rate of total 
asset, Acer has a distinguished growth rate at 12.73%. We found that Acer merged one 
of its controlled companies in 2001. Therefore, we take the growth rate of total assets 
of Acer only from 2002 to 2004 instead.
Next, substituting the input parameters into the estimation methods of fundamental 
value, the different fundamentals can be obtained. The first fundamental value is 
calculated using a well used Taiwanese practice denoted as Vx . The second 
fundamental value is calculated by theoretical derivation, denoted as V2 . All 
estimated fundamental values are presented in Table 6-1.
Analyzing the estimated fundamental values, there are three estimated value are very
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different from each other that they are the estimated Acer’s fundamental value by the 
theoretical estimation, Compal’s and Quanta’s have unrealistic estimated 
fundamental value by the practical estimation method. Their estimated fundamental 
values are lower than their average repurchase prices. This result shows that the real 
fundamental estimation method is invalid for the estimation of a company’s 
fundamental value when it has a lower price earning ratio, such as in the case of 
Campal and Quanta. The theoretical estimation method has no such problem dealing 
with the estimation of firm value with a lower price earning ratio. Nevertheless, the 
theoretical fundamental value estimation method could also be biased when 
estimating a firm’s value when it is experiencing sharp growth of its total assets. Acer 
is one such case. Acer has a quick growth of total assets because of the merger with 
one of its sub-companies in 2002. Though we have adopted the average method and 
tried to mitigate such an abnormal asset growth rate, the estimated fundamental value 
is still worse. In the following section, we only use the estimated fundamental value 
closer the actual price.
Except for those three estimated fundamental values, the other real trigger timings are 
defined as their individual fundamental values divided by their respective average 
repurchase prices, which are between 1.41-2.00. In spite of the discrepancy it still
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remains a practical consideration to launch a OMRs. Besides, as outsiders we are still 
unable to discuss which method (i.e. practical or theoretical) is better, the issuers 
know which method is more suitable for estimation of their own company’s 
fundamental value because of intimate knowledge of the respective company. We 
provide two different methods for consideration and subject them to further 
discussion and analysis.
6.4 Data analysis
The following data analysis is organised into five parts. The first part studies the
optimal trigger timings of one-time repurchase models under a given repurchase
volume and test whether the sampled companies operated OMRs optimally. The
second part tests the hypotheses which have been discussed in Section 5-4. This test
will reconfirm whether our developed models are consistent with capital investment
theory and numerical results by investigating real data. The third part studies the
optimal trigger timings of one-time repurchase models with optimal repurchase
volume and test whether sampled companies operated OMRs optimally. In the fourth
part, we analyse the sequential repurchase model. We will also analyse the difference
between the one-time repurchase model and the sequential repurchase model. In the
fifth part, we further conduct an extensive analysis to prove that OMRs can be a
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useful investment tool in a bear market. The study in this part aims to verify our 
research results as to whether it is consistent with the existing reference’s argument.
6.4.1 Optimal trigger timing study- one-time repurchase under given  
repurchase volume
1. Estimation of Optimal trigger timing
We analyse our optimal one-time repurchase models by substituting the required input 
data. The analysed results are presented in Table 6-2.
[Insert Table6-2 about here]
In the case of the optimal one-time repurchase model under a given repurchase 
volume, the optimal trigger timings, g* , of the sampled companies are quite close, 
they are between 0.541-0.676. This value indicates that a company’s optimal trigger 
timing holds when the market price falls down to a certain fraction of its fundamental 
value. Among the sampled companies, Realtek has the maximum trigger timing of
0.676. In other words, Realtek has to repurchase its outstanding share at the value
when the market price is equal to -------- of fundamental value to create the
1.966
maximum profit for its long-term shareholders. Similarly, we found that Acer has the 
minimum trigger value of 0.541. In other words, Acer has to repurchase its 
outstanding share at the value when the market price is equal to — ^  ■ of its 
fundamental value to reach its optimal repurchase timing strategy.
Incorporating both indices of the optimal trigger values and each sampled company’s 
volatility of stock return to conduct a cross analysis, the optimal trigger value has a 
positive relationship with its volatility of stock returns. In other words, a company 
with a bigger trigger value has to wait longer to catch up with higher contingent value. 
This verification of the studied optimal trigger timing is consistent with the numerical 
test of Chapter 5 and the existing investment theory by Copland/Antikarov (2000).
2. Test of joint repurchase performance under different fundamental values
Having the optimal trigger timing of each sampled company, we can now study 
whether the practical repurchase performance is consistent with the theoretical 
optimal trigger timing. However, the above optimal trigger timing result is indirect 
result. Issuers/ Investors have to refer to their fundamental values to re-calculate the
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optimal trigger prices. Hence, we need to employ the estimated company’s 
fundamental value to compute practical repurchase timings. Since different 
fundamental values studied and created, each company has two trigger values. Both 
the different trigger timings of each sampled company will be studied. This test is 
designed to test whether the practical repurchase value is consistent with the 
theoretically optimal trigger value.
The test is conducted by employing traditional statistic test methods to test their joint 
operative performances. We first take the natural log of the first type fundamental 
value divided by the average repurchase price, denoted as g, , and the index of natural 
log of the second type fundamental value divided by each practical average 
repurchase price, denoted as g2U- Before conducting the joint test of optimality, each 
sample company’s repurchase timing when calculated with the first type of 
fundamental value is lower than the optimal trigger timing. Thus, all sampled 
companies had triggered their OMRs too late, so that their market prices are 
undervalued for too long a time. They potentially exposed their companies to the 
threat of take-over. Similarly, we can analyse the sampled companies’ repurchase 
timing when calculated with the second type of fundamental value. Here, companies
11 The upper sub-notation represents different sampled companies, the lower sub-notation represents 
the practical trigger timing calculated by different fundamental value estimation
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trigger too early such as Compal, MTK, Quanata, Realtek, TSMC and UMC.
As for the joint consistency test between the optimal trigger value and the first type 
practical trigger value and to the second type practical trigger value, the test results 
are as presented in Table 6-2. The first type of joint consistency test rejects the 
hypothesis that practical OMRs operated optimally with 95% significance interval. 
That means that if the first type fundamental value is objective, then our sampled 
companies did not execute their OMRs optimally. Their repurchase strategies remain 
to be improved. Conversely, the joint consistent test between optimal trigger value 
and the second type practical trigger value didn’t reject the hypothesis that the 
practical OMRs have been operated optimally. In other words, if the second type 
fundamental value is consistent with the real fundamental value of sampled 
companies, we can then be assured that the joint practical repurchase performance is 
within significance interval, i.e., the sampled companies repurchase optimally.
Unfortunately, we are unable to get a consistent test result to comment whether the 
sampled companies repurchased their outstanding stocks optimally by referring to 
their different calculated fundamental values. The first type of fundamental value and 
the second type of fundamental value provide contradictory test results upon
diagnosis. This conclusion is only right because we have found that both estimated 
fundamental values are very different and thus have different joint repurchase test 
results. Conversely, this contradictory test result responds to our description section 
6.1 and the declaration by Ikerbeny/Vermalem (1996) that fundamental value is a 
decision factor in deciding the contingent value of OMRs and Issuers’ operative 
performance. Thus, the above result re-demonstrates that importance of getting the 
right fundamental value.
The test of joint repurchase performance has room for further improvements. For 
instance, it is unable to test whether practical OMRs trigger timing is consistent with 
capital investment theory and whether the trigger timing is consistent with the 
standard deviation of return or whether it is consistent with repurchase volume. To 
answer those theoretical arguments, more advanced analyses have to be analysed in 
the following section.
6.4.2 Theoretical hypothesis test to one-time repurchase model under a 
given repurchase volume
We intend to test hypothesis 1 in section 5.3. To conduct the test of optimality, this
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section employs the regression method to test the relationship between optimal trigger 
timing and the standard deviation of return; and to test the relationship between 
optimal trigger timing and repurchase volume. Same as the previous studies, both 
estimated fundamental values are employed to compute the practical repurchase 
timing. Therefore, there are four regression models which will be constructed and 
analysed. The analysed results are presented in Table 6-3.
[Insert Table6-3 about here]
Model 1 represents the regression models of endogenous variable, volatility of stock 
return, and exogenous variable, repurchasing timing under the first type of estimated 
fundamental value. Model 2 represents the regression models of endogenous variable, 
volatility of stock return, and exogenous variable, repurchasing timing under the 
second type of estimated fundamental value. Both models include small samples so 
we encounter the problem of pattern recognition.The analysed results show that both 
models have a positive relationship between the practical OMRs trigger timing and 
the standard deviation of return. We interpret that the joint practical OMRs operations 
are consistent with financial capital investment theory.12 However, Model 1 and
12 We have to note, however, that the results are not statistically significant, although the signs of the 
parameter estimates are all correct. This result can be attributed to the small sample size used and in 
future research an increased sample size would allow us to derive statistically significant results.
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Model 2 also indicate that both models have poor explanatory abilities R2 and poor 
effectiveness of model (Pr > F ) 13. We explain that either part of sampled companies' 
trigger timings are not highly consistent with its/ their standard deviation of retum(s) 
because a greater investment risk is expected to yield a greater contingent value. A 
poor explanatory ability and a poor effectiveness reveal that the sampled companies’ 
repurchase timing is not highly consistent with capital investment theory. This 
analysis provides a deeper analysis to demonstrate the test of optimality. Based on the 
analysed results, we recommend that the sampled company has to adjust their 
repurchase timing with a positive trend of standard deviation of its stock return.
In the analysis of trigger timing and repurchase volume, Model 3 represents the 
regression models of endogenous variable given the repurchase volume and 
exogenous variable repurchasing timing under the first type of estimated fundamental 
value. Model 4 represents the regression models of endogenous variable given the 
repurchase volume and exogenous variable repurchasing timing under the second type 
of estimated fundamental value. Because both models include small samples the 
problem of pattern recognition occurs. Within both regression analyses, Model 4
13 The p-value associated with this F value is used to answer "Do the independent variables reliably 
predict the dependent variable? The p-value is compared to your alpha level (typically 0.05) and, if 
smaller, we can conclude that the independent variables reliably predict the dependent 
variable". Conversely, if  the p-value were greater than 0.05, you would say that the group of 
independent variables does not show a statistically significant relationship with the dependent 
variable, or that the group of independent variables does not reliably predict the dependent variable.
122
shows that there is a positive relationship between the theoretical optimal trigger 
timing and the given repurchase volume; but Model 3 is even worse as it shows a 
negative relationship between the theoretical optimal trigger timing and the given 
repurchase volume. Both models have poor explanatory abilities (low R2) and poor 
effectiveness (Pr > F  )14. Most of the statistics in Model 3 and Model 4 shows that 
there are better repurchase volume strategies to be adopted.
Our demonstration can be supported by existing references by Ikenberry/Vermalen 
(1996) and Ikenberry et al. (2000). Reviewing the information of the repurchased 
volume in Table 6-1, the sampled company’s repurchase volumes are lower than the 
United States and Canada which have higher repurchase volumes. 
Ikenberry/Vermalen (1996) and Ikenberry et al. (2000) even ignored the case of 2.5 % 
below repurchase volume but this is close to our biggest repurchase volume of 
sampled companies. Those apparently small repurchase volumes proved that they are 
not optimal repurchase volume whatever the proof from the demonstration of this 
study or the empirical case from other experienced countries.
14 See as footnote 3 in this Chapter
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6.4.3 Optimal trigger timing study- one-time repurchase with Optimal
repurchase volume
Next, by employing the same analysis procedure, we calculate the optimal trigger 
timing with optimal trigger volume. This analysis aims to test practical operative 
performance as to whether it repurchases optimally in whatever repurchase timing and 
repurchase volume.
The calculated optimal trigger timing with the optimal trigger volume is represented 
in Table 6-2. Unfortunately, the calculated optimal trigger volume drifts away from 
the rational repurchase volume and the condition of repurchase volume, e.g., the 
repurchase volume condition which is 10 % below that of its issued shares.
Analysing the above unreasonable outputs, we can provide three explanations for this 
incomplete model development. First, the optimal repurchase volume does not 
consider the condition of threshold such as the optimal trigger timing which has to be 
greater than or equal to a certain value of XQ. There is also an unproven supposition 
about the threat of take-over. The model derivation of optimal trigger timing model 
with repurchase volume did not consider the threat of take-over, so that the result 
obtained was out of critical trigger timing. Second, the derivation of revenue
function in Chapter 5 assumes that the repurchase volume has a linear positive 
influence on the price difference between fundamental value and market price; 
however this assumption does need a deeper discussion in the case of optimal trigger 
volume. Third, a repurchase programme is influenced by the entire investment 
environment such as a company’s operating performance, company’s repurchase 
strategy, market change, and public investors’ participants. The developed optimal 
trigger timing with optimal repurchase volume model is developed only taking into 
consideration of mathematical optimization but ignoring the practical operational 
threat and the regulation of related rules, so that the obtained results are unreasonable. 
The optimal trigger timing with optimal repurchase volume model needs to be studied 
further with more thoughtful considerations.
Since the result of the optimal one-time repurchase model with optimal trigger 
volume is outside of reasonable trigger timing and trigger volume, we will not discuss 
it in the following comparison analysis on practical operations.
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6.4.4 Optimal trigger timing study- sequential repurchases
1. Estimation of Optimal trigger timing in sequential repurchases and the 
hypothesis to test the kink between first time buyback and the second time 
buyback
We analyse our optimal sequential repurchase model by substitution of required input 
data. The analysed result of optimal sequential trigger timing is presented in Table 6-4. 
With respect to the sequential repurchase model in theoretical explanations, the first 
time buyback is the same as the one-time repurchase model because the instantaneous 
market price is the price dynamics without share repurchases and the expected return 
of the issuer is the same as that in the one-time repurchase model. The following 
stochastic diffusion is the change of price dynamics with share repurchases. In the 
following empirical investigation, we will address and investigate the differences of 
repurchase activity between optimal one-time repurchase model under a given 
repurchase volume and optimal sequential repurchase model.
[Insert Table 6-4 about here]
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Incorporating the information in Tables 6-2 and 6-4, the first time optimal trigger 
value of the repurchase in a sequential model is roughly the same as the value of the 
one-time repurchase model. The optimal trigger value has a more noticeable 
difference between the first-time repurchase and the second-time repurchase for all 
sampled companies. However, the optimal trigger value has no big difference between 
the second-time repurchases and the following repurchases for all sampled companies. 
This result demonstrates that in hypothesis 2 there is a kink between the first time 
buyback and the second time buyback as discussed when analyzing the model in Ch 
5.2.3. This phenomenon can be explained from a stochastic diffusion perspective: one 
is dynamic with share repurchase, while the other is dynamic without share 
repurchases. Before an issuer launches its repurchase activity, the stochastic diffusion 
is a dynamic without repurchase shock in the market. The kink is normal and is 
consistent with exceptional economic behaviour such as entry by a new competitor in 
a market with few firms, so that price suddenly drops. The new market price becomes 
a further fair market price.
The expected trigger value is the price difference at that time. Under the expectation 
of triggering an investment, an issuer will wait until the optimal timing to launch its 
investment to make a maximum profit, so that it has the biggest price difference at
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that time. When the first timing repurchase activity has been realised, the price 
difference is changed immediately because we assume that our repurchase strategy is 
able to salvage the undervalued market price. The stochastic diffusion of shares is a 
dynamic with a repurchase disturbance. The issuer still keeps the same expected 
return. The optimal trigger point is tangential to the differential curve which is the 
point on the stochastic diffusion curve with the previous repurchase influence, ie, 
dgs = -Xq + Xasdz . Except for a kink between first time repurchase and second time 
repurchase, they are almost the same in the following repurchase timing/ repurchase 
volume.
2. Hypothesis test of joint sequential repurchase performance to save the 
undervalued prices
One important assumption of the optimal sequential repurchase model is that the price
difference should decrease with increased execution of repurchase activities. This is
exactly as with hypothesis 3 that repurchases are conducted to salvage the falling
price. To test this hypothesis, we employ a regression analysis to test this hypothesis.
The exogenous variable is the variable of the natural log current price divided by its
p
lagged price, denoted as l n - ^ .  This exogenous variable represents the rate of
payoff of executing a stock repurchase. If this variable has a positive sign, the 
repurchase performance is consistent with hypothesis 3; otherwise, it is not. The 
endogenous variable is the given repurchase volume which is denoted as Aqt+]. 
Because this model includes small samples the problem of pattern recognition occurs.
The analysed results are presented in Table 6-5; the result shows that there is an 
inverse relationship between repurchase volume and the rate of repurchase. This 
model also has a weak explanatory ability with respect to the input exogenous 
variable and endogenous variables. The inverse relationship between repurchase 
volume and the rate of payoff is consistent with the numerical analysis in Chapter 5 if 
practical OMRs are operated optimally. We have explained this phenomenon and will 
not re-interpret it again. Nevertheless, if practical OMRs did not operate optimally, we 
interpret this as a negative relationship between rates of payoff and repurchase 
volume. Under the price condition and volume condition, the ruled repurchase 
circumstance prevents market participants from manipulating the market price, so that 
the falling price did not rise. These repurchase conditions might result in a negative 
relationship between rate of payoff and repurchase volume.
As regards the poor explanatory ability in Model 5, similarly, this is likely due to the
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limitations under the price and volume conditions. These conditions are successfully 
preventing market participants from manipulating the market price, so that parts of 
repurchase activity effectively save the falling price but others do not. There is no 
clear trend between the endogenous variable and the exogenous variable.
6.4.5 Analysis o f  cumulative rate o f  return o f  executing OMRs
The numerical analysis in section 5.2 and the regression analysis of sequential 
repurchases in section 6.4.4 show that the interaction between repurchase volume and 
optimal trigger timing bear a negative relationship when repurchase volume is small. 
Though we have explained this phenomenon, people could still misunderstand that the 
small repurchase volume will discourage share repurchase. The numerical analyses in 
sections 5.2 and the regression analysis of sequential repurchases in section 6.4.4 did 
not demonstrate that the OMRs are able to salvage the undervalued stock price. In 
particular, the analysis in section 6.4.4 will provide a wrong impression that executing 
share repurchase could damage the investment return of repurchasing stock. The 
following analysis proves that employing cumulative returns in different time stages 
to explain that OMRs are an efficient tool of investment to salvage the undervalued 
price.
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The analysis starts with collecting one year historical price data for 2004 and dividing 
it into three stages: ex-ante repurchase stage that is between January 1, 2004 and the 
day prior to the commencement of the share repurchase, the repurchase stage, and the 
ex-post stage which is after the expiry date of repurchase to the end of December 31, 
2004. Since the sampled companies launched their repurchase programme on 
different days during 2004, each company has a different time length of ex ante period 
and ex post repurchase period. Therefore, the critical test index which will be 
employed is the average cumulative return, which is presented in Eq. (6.4)




i : sampled company
j :  time period
n'j: days of different company in different time period
[Insert Table 6-6 about here]
Table 6-6 shows that the average cumulative return (ACR) in the ex ante stage has a
lower return than the repurchasing period for each sampled company whatever single 
company or joint means of cumulative return. The results presented here are fairly 
consistent with the results previously reported in the literature. This is because 
executing OMRs have successfully shrunk the magnitude of the falling price, so that 
executing OMRs are a good tool of investment. However, people will question why
p
there is a negative relationship between single l n - ^  and Aq but a positive 
contribution to the cumulative returns. This is because executing share repurchase has 
the ability to shrink the magnitude of falling price but it might be unable to reverse the 
falling pricing immediately15. This result is significant because it not only 
demonstrates that OMRs can be a tool of investment but it also solves the puzzle 
between the increased repurchase volume and the change of price difference between 
fundamental value and share price. Though this test method is simple, it makes for a 
seamless good analysis.
The joint cumulative return and joint average cumulative return of ex poste period is 
best amongst different time stages. We explain this phenomenon because the company 
increased investors’ confidence by signaling the good health of the company’s 
operation through buying back outstanding shares which the company viewed as
15 The relative rules restrict the repurchase price such that this cannot be over the stock price of the 
previous transaction day in some countries.
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undervalued, which in turn stimulated more investors to invest in the company. This 
result even re-enhances the function of share repurchase in OMR execution as a tool 
of investment. Based on this empirical investigation, we recommend that companies 
have to continue executing OMRs as a form of regular investment behaviour in order 
to save the undervalued price in a bear market.
6.5 Summary
The developed optimal trigger timing models provide a solution characterized by 
maximum profit. Therefore, it is suitable for launching OMRs for the purpose of 
maintaining a firm’s credit standing and the rights of shareholders. Based on this 
principle, we sampled seven Taiwanese IT companies within the FTSE Taiwan 50 
index which executed OMRs in 2004. These are UMC, Compal, TSMC, Acer, Realtek, 
Quanta and MTK.
The fundamental value is an important parameter to estimate the theoretical optimal 
trigger price and an important parameter to test practical OMRs operative 
performances. In this study, both theoretical and practical estimation methods are 
employed to calculate different fundamental values for further applications and to
provide further explanations and comments.
For the theoretical optimal repurchase timing model study, both one-time repurchase 
model under a given repurchase volume, the one-time repurchase model with optimal 
repurchase volume, and the optimal sequential repurchase model are investigated.
We employed the optimal one-time repurchase model under a given repurchase 
volume to test practical operations. We find that part of practical operations did not 
follow the capital investment theory to execute their OMRs programmes, such as 
those which did not execute their repurchase timing with consideration of the standard 
deviation of return. Besides, the test result shows that their repurchase volume 
strategies also have poor explanations for the optimal trigger timing study.
In addition, we also analyse the difference between the one-time repurchase model 
under a given repurchase volume and the optimal sequential model, though we did not 
find that there is a big difference in repurchase timing between the one-time model 
and the first time repurchase sequential model. However, there are kinks between the 
first time repurchase timing and the second-time repurchase timing amongst the 
sampled companies.
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As OMRs have the extra function of saving the undervalued share price, we next 
conduct an analysis on the cumulative rate of return in different time stages: ex ante 
repurchase stage, repurchasing stage, and the ex-post repurchase stage. The 
empirical investigation demonstrates that executing share repurchase is able to save 
the falling market price.
6.6 Critical analysis
OMRs are regarded as a form of investment behaviour. Our developed models are 
able to derive the optimal trigger timing for such capital investment. This is a 
significant contribution in practice given that optimal trigger timing is important to 
investors.
We introduce in the first chapter the various powerful functions of OMRs such as 
adjustment of the capital structure, signaling private information, and takeover 
defense etc. Our developed models, however, cannot take all these functions into 
account due to the limiting problems of the modeling process and solution.
In addition, from conducting the above empirical study, we found that there are
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several input parameters which cannot be obtained easily such as the liquidity 
parameter, A , and a company’s fundamental value.
Furthermore, references also document that other investor considerations such as 
company size, dividend, reputation, and the experience of executing OMRs are also 
taken into account. We ignored such considerations but employ the market liquidity 
parameter, A,  instead. Unfortunately, the individual liquidity parameter cannot be 
obtained. We assume that each sample company has the same liquidity parameter in 
estimating each sampled company’s optimal trigger timing though it is not very 
reasonable in practical OMRs operations.
Regarding the sample size for this empirical investigation, the sampled companies are 
the most representative companies in Taiwan, but the sample size is small. In the 
above empirical investigation, we are unable to avoid the error of small sample 
problem; the distribution of standard deviation does not follow normal distribution.
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Chapter 7 
Conclusions and further 
studies
7,1 Conclusions
OMRs have demonstrated their functions in terms of money distribution, employee 
compensation, adjustment of the capital structure, and as a takeover defense etc. An 
active function of executing OMRs is that it has been treated as a tool of investment. 
However, up-to-date, most of the references in this field aim to study the short-term 
share price change or the share return surrounding the announcement period, the 
starting day and the long term influence to the executing OMRs.
There is a lack of study providing optimal trigger timing to issuers. Aiming at this
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research gap, this study undertakes an optimal trigger timing study to OMRs under 
uncertainty. As OMRs are executed in open market, it could damage the benefit of 
public investors. Further, OMRs are characterised as a non-commitment money 
distribution strategy. To analyse its relative limitations and its inherent flexibilities is 
necessary before constructing an optimal trigger timing model to OMRs. When 
constructing a complete survey to the relative rules and regulations in several typical 
countries who allow executing OMRs, there are three important conditions that rule 
the execution of OMRs these are: price condition, volume condition, and timing/ 
duration condition. These conditions compose a safe harbour to protect public 
investors. Issuers of OMRs programme must have sufficient flexibilities within the 
above listed conditions to create maximum profit for their long-term shareholders.
In the aspect of investment, executing OMRs is a non-commitment sequential 
investment with limitations of investment price and volume conditions at each stage. 
Since OMRs has very similar characters with American type options, especially, 
OMRs is executed in an uncertain open market, by employing an option-based pricing 
method to construct an optimal trigger timing model and is naturally the best research 
method.
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Our development process of construction begins with a one-time repurchase model 
under given repurchase volume, and then extends it the developed model to a 
one-time repurchase model with optimal repurchase volume. Finally, we extend the 
developed basic model to a sequential model. Similar with the well-known 
Black-Scholes model, our developed one-time repurchase model requires five 
parameters which are: risk free rate, total issued shares, total repurchase volume (this 
is not needed for the one-time repurchase model with optimal repurchase volume), 
liquidity parameter, and standard deviation of return. The developed sequential model 
requires the above five parameters plus an additional three which are: maximum talent 
trigger value, repurchase frequency, and average repurchase volume at each stage. 
These three developed models are able to provide the best trigger timing of OMRs.
After the developed models were completed, a numerical analyses to verify the 
effectiveness of developed models was undertaken. The numerical analysis of two of 
our one-time repurchase volume models (i.e. the optimal trigger timing model with 
given repurchase volume and the optimal trigger timing model with optimal 
repurchase volume) confirms they are consistent with capital investment theory. 
They have both a positive relationship between the variance and the trigger timing 
and both have a negative relationship between risk free rate and trigger timing. In
other words, the numerical analysis points that a higher repurchase risk combines a 
bigger trigger timing to yield a bigger profit, and a higher risk free rate pushes issuers 
to trigger repurchase activity earlier. Both results demonstrate our one-time 
repurchase models are consistent with capital investment theory. Besides, the 
sequential repurchase model, the numerical test results are mostly the same as to the 
two one-time repurchase models except that there is a negative relationship with 
optimal trigger timing in the condition of small repurchase volume. We can explain 
this finding by considering the profits the company would make from the repurchase 
as defined by its objective function. When repurchasing a small amount, the profits 
will be relatively small. Thus, when the values differ only marginally, it is beneficial 
to wait for a larger difference as this would translate to a higher profit.
Finally, an empirical examination to test the application of practical operation was 
conducted. The sampled companies comprise in part the FTSE Taiwan 50. These are: 
Acer, Compal, MTK, Quanta, Realtek, TSMC, and UMC. The fundamental value of 
each company is important because it reveals whether or not to launch a OMRs and 
where the optimal trigger timing point occurs. The complete empirical investigation is 
summarised as follows:
Optimal one-time repurchase timing model under given repurchase volume:
1. The theoretical optimal trigger timings are between 0.541-0.676. In other words,
when market price falls down to — --------— market price issuers should execute
1..97 1.72
a buyback programme to create maximum profit for their long-term shareholders.
2. Using the fundamental value derived from financial theory, the test of joint 
repurchase performance reveals that the sampled companies had triggered their 
OMRs too late, so that their market prices are undervalued for too long a time. 
They potentially exposed their companies to the threat of take-over.
3. Using the fundamental value derived from finance practice in Taiwan, we see that 
the test of joint repurchase performance reveals that the sampled companies 
repurchase optimally.
4. With both estimated fundamental values, the theoretical test of higher risk 
combining with a bigger trigger volume points than the sampled companies have a 
positive response to this theory. However, the weak explanation and poor model 
effectiveness also prove that part of our sample companies did not trigger OMRs 
at the optimal trigger timing.
5. With estimated theoretical fundamental values, the theoretical test of a bigger 
repurchase volume combined with a bigger repurchase timing points that there is a 
negative relationship between repurchase volume and repurchase timing. This
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result violates capital investment theory. With estimated practical fundamental 
values, the theoretical test of a bigger repurchase volume combine with a bigger 
repurchase timing points that there is positive relationship between repurchase 
volume and repurchase timing. This result is consistent with capital investment 
theory. However, a poor model explanation and a poor model of effectiveness 
revealed that the sampled companies remain to improve their repurchase volume 
strategy.
Optimal one-time repurchase timing with given repurchase volume model:
The developed optimal one-time repurchase timing with given repurchase volume 
model fails to provide a realistic repurchase strategy. The lacking considerations of 
repurchase volume restriction and price-volume behaviour in the solution process is 
with the result that optimal trigger volume is out of the rules’ regulation.
The model of optimal sequential repurchase timing under given repurchase volume:
1. The estimated sequential optimal trigger timing result reveals there is a kink 
between the first time repurchases and the second time repurchases, but then the 
following trigger timings remain stable. The kink is consistent with rational 
economic behaviour. It thus demonstrates the validity of the developed optimal
sequential repurchase timing model.
2. The analysis to the relationship between repurchase return and repurchase volume 
reveals that there is a negative relationship between both of them. However, this 
result suposes that it is influenced by ineffective market response and relative 
repurchase price restriction. To provide a deeper analysis to prove OMRs can be a 
tool to salvage undervalued market price, a further analysis of average cumulative 
return is studied.
3. The cumulative return analysis is designed to divide time as three stages: ex ante 
repurchase stage, repurchasing stage, and ex post repurchase stage. The statistic 
tests to those three stages are significant in that the average cumulative return are 
different in these three stage. In addition, the analysed result reveals that the 
average cumulative return of ex post stage is better than repurchasing stage; also 
the average cumulative return of repurchasing stage is better than ex ante stage. 
These results demonstrate the power function of executing OMRs can be used to 
salvage the undervalued market price.
7.2 Further studies
Further study can move forward in the directions: one is study the required input
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variables for the estimation and verification of model. Another approach to further the 
study is to extend the model to include more realistic features such as including the 
time value of the option.
Regarding input variables, such as market liquidity, an individual company has 
different characteristics such as firm size and reputation etc. which yield different 
market liquidity when a company announces a buyback programme. Alas, to assure 
all sampled companies have same market liquidity is unrealistic. In addition, as 
mentioned in previous references, the fundamental value is an important parameter to 
decide whether implement OMRs and to decide the option value/ optimal trigger 
timing. Although, there are two different fundamental value estimation methods are 
provided, but part estimated fundamental values are far-fetch to the reality. Creating 
an objective and accurate estimation method is thus important.
In the aspect of model development, optimal one-time repurchase timing with given 
repurchase volume model fails to provide realizable repurchase strategy. The further 
study can start from this drawback to begin improvements such as price- volume 
behaviour of shares under repurchase announcement. Also the enhancing optimal 
sequential repurchase timing with given repurchase volume model can be extended to
sequential optimal repurchase timing and the optimal repurchase volume model to 
provide a closer realistic assistant decision-making technology.
Although the OMRs signalling effect is hard to appraise, the signal does positively 
effect a company’s effort to salvage an undervalued share price, McNally (1999) and 
Isagawa (2000, 2002). It is worthwhile to include the signalling effect into the optimal 
trigger timing model.
Finally, a game choice option-based model also merits further study. This model must 
take into account both the price-volume behaviour and the market response from other 
market participants for the model to be complete. This requires more information 
between issuers and other market participants.
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Table 2-2 the relative rules of OMRs of sampled countries
Condition
Country
Approval Timing Restriction Price Restriction Volume Restriction
USA None No repurchase during last 30 
mins of a trading day
No higher than highest 
current price or last 
independent sale price
#
(in September 2001 
restrictions on daily 
repurchase volume were 
suspended)
Japan No need after 1997 No repurchase during last 30 
mins of a trading day
No higher than last day price No more higher than 25% 
trading day
UK Shareholder meeting 18 mo limit No higher than 5% of 5 day 
average price
15% of total shares
France Approval by CBO 18 mo limit, 15 days before 
EA
No higher than daily high 10% o f total shares, 25% of 
daily volume
Germany Shareholder meeting 18 mo limit Shareholder meeting: max 
and min have to be 
determined
10% of total shares
Canada Board 12 mo limit No higher than highest 
current price or last 
independent sale price
No more 10% o f public float, 
5% of total shares, or 2% in 
20 days
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Table 2-2 the relative rules of OMRs of sampled countries (continuous)
Condition
Country
Approval Timing Restriction Price Restriction Volume Restriction
Italy Shareholder meeting 18 mo limit No higher than most recent 
price
10% of total shares, 25% of 
monthly volume
Netherlands Shareholder meeting 18 mo limit Shareholder meeting: max 
and min
10% of total shares
Switzerland Board # # 10% of total shares
Hong Kong Shareholder meeting 12 mo limit; and 1 mo before 
earning announcement
# 10% of total shares, 25% of 
monthly volume
Taiwan Board 12 mo limit No higher than last day price 10% of total shares, 25% of 
average turnover
Source: Kim et al. (2003) and collection of this study 
Remark: # represents no record about the regulation
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Table 6-2 Optimal trigger timings of one-time repurchase models
The following table summaries the relative variables to estimate the optimal one-time repurchase models and the optimal trigger timings, given repurchase 
volume and optimal repurchase volume. Since there are two different estimated fundamental value, the joint optimality tests for one-time repurchase model with 
given repurchase volume are two. The joint optimality tests for one-time repurchase model with optimal repurchase volume are ignored because the unrealized 
estimated trigger timings. (Critical value of t-test for sample size 4 is 2.571; Critical value of t-test for sample size 5 is 2.447)
Acer Compal MTK Realtek Quanta TSMC UMC
•
g 0.541560613 0.5955079 0.59225904 0.676282204 0.583439388 0.562504507 0.593614049
* *
g 1.071160481 1.179801315 1.177599487 1.345261161 1.160344456 1.11813332 1.178546088
( f 4.214844107 4.642328303 4.633664466 5.293386169 4.565768693 4.399674669 4.637389187
gx 0.409030174 - 0.357013365 0.543474572 - 0.385124832 0.47210244
gl - 0.767514955 0.46226722 0.775235777 0.626785257 0.474381529 0.780063603
^(g’/g l) -3.497305964
^(g*/g2 ) 1.236415033
optimal trigger timing with given repurchase volume; g**: optimal trigger timing with optimal repurchase volume; Q**; optimal trigger volume; 
g j: practical trigger timing with theoretical fundamental volume; g2: practical trigger timing with theoretical fundamental volume
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Table 6-3 Theoretical hypothesis test
Model 1 and Model 2 demonstrate the relationship between practical trigger timing and the standard deviation of return. Model 3 and Model 
4 demonstrate the relationship between practical trigger timing and the repurchase volume. Between Model 1 and Model 3, the sample 
companies of Compal and Quanta are ignored because they have unrealistic trigger timing that is estimated with practical fundamental 
evaluation. Hence, there are five sampled companies in the studies. Similarly, Acer is ignored in Model 2 and Model 4.
Hypothesis 1: the optimal trigger timing has a positive relationship with the standard deviation o f return, os and the optimal trigger 
timing has a positive relationship with the repurchase volume, Q
Parameter Estimate t Value R-Square P r > F
Model 1 Intercept -2.22341 -0.71 0.5969 0.1256
Stand derivation of return 3.47021 2.11
g \ = < h + b xCTs
Model 2 Intercept -0.62248 -0.65 0.3056 0.2553
Stand derivation of return 6.62632 1.33
g2 = a2 +b2as
Model 3 Intercept 0.44631 7.92 0.0313 0.7758
Q -1.36467 -0.31
g\ =ai +biQ




Table 6-4 Optimal trigger timing of sequential repurchases
This optimal sequential repurchase timing analysis is conducted by substituting each company’s different repurchase frequency, given repurchase volume 
and the other necessary input variables into the model to calculate the optimal sequential repurchase timing. Therefore, every repurchase has optimal 
repurchase timing, i.e. TSMC has 14 optimal repurchase timing consistent with its 14 repurchase activities. The comparison to the trigger timings 
between first time buyback and the second time buyback demonstrates there is a kink between two of them. In other words, the hypothesis is proved in 
this analysis.
Realtek TSMC UMCCompel QuantaAcer MTK
Repur. Times
0.589270.559040.66547 0.58977 0.58864 0.57974 0.67254














Table 6-5 Theoretical hypothesis test
Model 5 intends to demonstrate whether a practical repurchase activity is able to salvage the undervalued stock price. In this analysis, we 
initially collect the repurchase return and the repurchase volume of every repurchase activity of each sampled company followed by a 
regression analysis to analyse the relationship between the endogenous and exogenous variables. 16
Hypothesis 3: the repurchase activity is able to save the undervalued share price
Parameter Estimate t Value R-Square Pr > F
Model 5 Intercept -0.00172 -0.16 0.0115 0.5468
Aq. -3.01479 -0.61
ln - a s + bsAqi
16 The repurchase shock is defined as A q  / A Q . In this analysis, A is ignored because A  is assumed to be the same for all sampled companies
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This sketch figure shows the different time periods in 2004 - ex ante period, repurchasing period, and ex-poste period. The time length o f the repurchase 
period is two months for each sampled company but the time lengths of the ex ante period and ex post period o f each company are different because sampled
p
companies executed OMRs on different repurchase days. The cumulative return is calculated by taking In —— at different time periods.
E x  A n t e  P e r i o d  R e p u r c h a s i n g  P e r i o d  E x  P o s t  P e r i o d
Figure 6-3: Different time periods in 2004
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Table 6-6 Test of cumulative return to each sample company
Ex Ante Stage Repurchasing Stage Ex Poste Stage
Return C.R. A.C.R. C.R. A.C.R. C.R. A.C.R.
Acer -0.0518 -0.001 -0.0396 -0.0009 0.2307 0.0015
Compal -0.1157 -0.0021 -0.0337 -0.0008 -0.1177 -0.0008
MTK -0.1201 -0.0014 -0.0977 -0.0023 0.5683 0.0021
Quanta -0.2353 -0.0029 0.0445 0.0011 -0.0509 -0.0004
Realtek -0.3418 -0.0042 0.0339 0.0008 -0.0091 -0.0001
TSMC -0.1747 -0.0034 -0.1747 -0.0019 0.0677 0.0004
UMC -0.0726 -0.0014 -0.0144 -0.0003 -0.2131 -0.0014
Mean -0.15886 -0.00234 -0.04024 -0.00061 0.06799 0.00019
SD 0.101513 0.001191 0.076125 0.001268 0.26152 0.001248
tex ante-* ex post -15.3502 (p=-0.0000)
^ex ante-*repurchasm g
-8.54506 (p=-0.0000)
^repurchasing—>gx ante -5.4365 (p=-0.0016)
Remark: C.R.: cumulative return; A.C.R.: average cumulative return; S.D.: Standard deviation of return
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Appendix A: Derivation of Differential Equation/ Diffusion 
Equation
A contingent value is considering as a function that it is twice differential in S  and 
once in t, denote it as F (S , t) .  Among this derivation, S is assumed that the
underlying asset and it’s instantaneously change is a simple Brown-Wiener process:
dF \ d lF ,  dFdF = — dS+  + —  (1)
dS 2 dS2 V '  dt
d ( l n S ) * ^  = asdt + crsdz (2)
Eq.(4-2) have an optimal stopping problem in continuous time. F (S , t ) , yields no 
cash flows up to the time of exercise (T )  that the investment is undertaken, the only 
return from holding it is its capital appreciation. Hence in the continuous region, the 
above exercise strategy can be written as Eq. (3)
pFdt = E (dF) (3)
For simplicity, ignoring the influence of time factor to the contingent value, then dF 
is expanded by ordinary derivation as follows:
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E{dF) = E(F,dt + Fsd S +




Fdt + a.SFdt + -  cr2S2F d tt  b s  2  S ss
Incorporating Eq (3) into Eq. (4), then the optimal differential equation can be 
obtained as Eq. (5)
±<T2sS1Fss+asSFs - p F  = -Fl (5)
In a real world investment consideration, the instantaneous change of the option value 
in time factor could be vanishing at two scenarios. One is that the influence factor has 
only a slight influence on the option value. People can simply ignore its existence. 
The other scenario is that a real investment can last for a longer project life. In this 
case, Eq. (4-4) can be derived as
^ S 2Fss+asSFs - p F  = 0 (6)
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2. Solution Process:
Eq. (6) is subject to the following constraints
feSF (5'»0 = o
F(S,t) = S - C  




Eq. (6) is an ordinary Eular equation. It has the general solution of
F = A]S fil+A2S ^ (10)
To solve P , we can write the general form as F = ASP for simplicity.
Substituting the general solution into Eq. (6), then




1 2 -av+ — C7 |±.2 SJ )
\2
a o — a + 2 p a 2
(11)
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The constraint of Eq. (7) enforces A2 to be equal to zero. Therefore, the general 
solution of Eq (6) remains as
F = AiS* (12)
Next, we can depend on the general solution of Eq. (8) with the value matching 
function and the high contact conditions to solve the optimal trigger point.
Firstly, differentiating Eq. (12) by S and then equating the new differential equation 
to Eq. (9), we can solve it as
F5 =A/3{S')M = 1
we can write A = i > • )
i- p
p { ? V  p
Substituting Eq. (13) into Eq. (12) and putting it to be equal to Eq. (8),
(13)
then, we can solve the optimal contingent value evaluation model with boundary 
conditions




F (s' A ( A - 1? *  J  A
\ P \   ^J
c A =■ (15)




Thus, we obtain the optimal S* and F *.
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Appendix B: Ordinary Differential Equation Derivation: One-time
Repurchases
Bellman’s Principle of Optimality which indicates the total expected return on the
investment opportunity is equal to its expected rate of capital appreciation that over a
time interval d T . Mathematically, it can be represents as
pFdT = E(dF) (1)
Taking approximation by Taylor expansion to the right-hand-side of Eq. (1) then we
can have
dF = Ftdt + Fg(g)dg +—Fgg (g)dg2 (2)
Under the expectation theory, the Eq. (2) can be rewritten as follows
E[dF] = E Fldt + Fg(g)Aasdz+^Fgg(g)A2a 2dt
Since the expected dz is equal to zero, and we assume time factor just has small
influence to the contingent value change17, therefore
17 The life of one-time repurchase model or a real investment is long so that the time factor has slightly 
effect to the contingent value change. We disregard this influence to the contingent value
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E[dF] = E^Fg (g®- ^ )d t \+~ Fm ( g t l7a]dl^ (3)
Substituting Eq. (3) into Eq. (1), then we can have
Eq. (4) subjects to the following conditions
lim F(g) = 0 (5)
g - *  o
r 1 x
F{g) = QN g - ^ Q  (6)
Fs {g)  = QN  (7)
Eq. (4) is the standard ordinary differential equation which has the characteristic of 
solution non-repeated to zero. Its general solution is exponential type, write it as 
F (g )  = Aiefiig+A2ePa (8)
The Eq. (5) rules out the second part of general solution, Eq.(8). Therefore the final 
general solution of Eq. (4) remains as
F (g )  = A,e*s (9)
Differentiating Eq. (9) and ask it is equal to Eq. (7)
F (g )  = 4 fie** ' = Q N ,S 
or
18 The sub-notation represents tangent point or optimal trigger point
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Substituting Eq. (10) into Eq. (9) and ask it is equal to Eq. (6)
S F -e* *  e te ' =Qn {g * - - A Q
f ix  V  2  *
g * = - + - A Q
Substituting Eq. (11) into Eq. (6), then
Substituting Eq. (11) into Eq. (6), then 
A = &Le-to- = & L ei w -
A  A  A
Substituting Eq. (13) into Eq. (9), then
F (g )  = A ^ s = ^ L e ^ s'e^8 = ^ L e^ s~s'
K }  '  f i  f ix Pi e
The complete solution process is completed.
Appendix C: Mathematical proof to the developed models follow  
capital investment theory
Eq. (5-13) P = ? and Eq. (5-14) g* -  -  +—A.Q reveals the results of the
Acrs P  2
one-time repurchase model under given repurchase volume. Substituting Eq. (5-13) 
into Eq. (5-14), we then can rewrite Eq. (5-14) as
(1)
If the crs is a variable, we can differentiate g* by cr5, which becomes 
dg A
(2)d(7s y/2p
Since A and p  are positive, we prove that the optimal trigger timing of the 
one-time repurchases under given repurchase volume has a positive relationship with
< 7 . .
Similarly, the optimal trigger timing derived from the model of the optimal trigger
2timing with optimal repurchase volume is equal to g* -  — . Substituting Eq. (5-13) 
into g *, we can then have
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g« _ 2X<j s
(3)
If the <j s is a variable, differentiating g* by crs , then becomes
(4)
Since X and p  are positive, we prove that the optimal trigger timing of the 
one-time repurchases with optimal repurchase volume has a positive relationship with
Finally, if the given repurchase volume is changeable, differentiating Eq. (5-14) by Q , 
then becomes
$ L  = -  (5)
dQ 2
Eq. (5) also demonstrates that the optimal trigger timing under given repurchase 
volume has a positive relationship with Q .
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Appendix D: Partial Differential Equation Derivation - Sequential
Repurchases
The contingent function is a real function with two real variables. The differentiation 
of contingent function is sum up the partial differential equations. In a discrete 
representation, it can be presented as follows:
F (g + Ag,k  + M ) = F (g ,k) + [Fg (g ,k) Ag + Fk (g ,k )M ]
+ ^ [ Fa,(S ’* )(A? ) 2 + 2A ?A « v U ,A ) + Fu ( g , t ) ( M ) 2]  ( 1)
or
AE (g, k ) = [Fg (g, k ) Ag + Fk (g, k) Ak~\
1 r 2 21
+ ^ [ /r« U » * )(4 s) + 2AgAkFgk(g,k) + Fkk(g,k)(Ak)  J
when A is very small, we can represent the discrete equation to be a continuous type 
dF (g,k) = [>g (g ,k)dg  + Fk (g ,k)dk]
(2)
+ U "* )(* )2 + 2F** («>*)*<* + Fh («,*) (<*)’]
dg = -Xqdt + Acrsdz and dk = -qdt (4)
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Substituting Eq. (4) into Eq. (3) with expectation
E(dF(g,k))  = E
[Fg U ’k)(-Aqdt + Acrsdz) + Fk (g ,k )(-qdt)\
1H----
2!
Fgg (# ’k ) dt  + ^ sdz)2
+2Fgk (g,k)(-Xqdt + Aasdz)(-qdt)
+Fkk{gik){-qdt)1
(5)
The expected dz is equal to zero and the value of dtdz and (dt)2 are too negligible. 
We neglect the value of dtdz and (dt)2. Therefore, Eq. (5) can be rewritten as Eq. 
(6).
E (dF (g ,k)) = j F a A2cr* (g ,k )d t -  AqFg (g ,k )d t -  qFk (g,k)dt  (6)
Since Bellman tells pF (g ,k )d t  = E(dF(g,k))  (7)
Therefore ^ F ggX2a 2s (g,k)-XqFg(g ,k)~  p F (g ,k ) -q F k(g,k) = 0 (8)
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Appendix £: Model Derivation and Explanation - Sequential
Repurchases
pF(g,k)dt = E(dF(g,k)) (1)
Eq. (1) is the Bellman’s Principle of Optimality which indicates that over a time 
intervale#, the total expected return on the investment opportunity, pFdt , is equal 
to its expected rate of capital appreciation. Then dF (g ,k ) is expanded by ordinary 
derivation, and the optimal contingent value function can be presented as follows:
Eq. (2) is a partial differential equation that considers the influence of asymmetry 
payoff and the total remaining expenditure to the contingent value of OMRs. Eq. (2) 
has many solutions, corresponding to all the different derivations that can be defined 
with g  and k as the underlying variables. The particular derivative obtained when 
the equation is solved depends on the boundary conditions that are used. These 
specify the values of the derivative at the boundaries of possible values of g  and k . 
In the case of stock repurchases, the key boundary condition that we can observe is
(S’k )~ A(*Fg k )~ P F {g’k )~<lFk {g’k ) = 0 (2)
183
the limitations of asymmetry payoff, g . The boundary conditions that are imposed on
g  are:
lim F(g,& ) = 0 and (3)
(4)
Eq. (3) is the result of the fact that if the market share price tends to an extreme small 
value or the fundamental value ever reaches zero, then the repurchase programme will 
never be exercised and will become worthless. Eq. (4) is the result of the fact that if 
the market share price has fallen to a certain price, then the Issuer will face an 
immediate threat of take-over, g is the critical price before this threat appears and 
g is correspondent with a contingent value F (g ,k )  = B (g ) .  g  is given by the 
professional Issuers’ judgment. Therefore limF(g,A:) = i?(g) is a constant.
Mathematically, Eq. (3) and Eq. (4) are boundary conditions of Eq. (2). Besides, the 
solution of Eq (2) requires an initial solution, which is when k = 0. In order to cover 
all potential solutions of Eq.(2), the value of the option at the initial stage, F (g ,0 ) , is 
assigned to be equal to h (g ) , as indicated in Eq. (5).
F(g,0) = h(g) (5)
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With the above proper boundary conditions, then Separable Differential Equations can 
be employed to solve Eq. (2). The solution technique - variable separation, separates 
the whole result into two parts: a steady state result and a transit state result. The part 
of steady state represents the influence of variable g  on the contingent sequential 
repurchase value; the other part of the transit result represents the influence of 
variable k on the contingent sequential repurchase value. Eqs. (3), (4) and (5) are 
sufficient and are necessary conditions for the general solution of Eq. (2) to be 
obtained.
Solution Process
First, let F(g, k) = <f){g, k) + w(g), and therefore Eq. (2) can be rewritten as 
i  A2cr2 (<pgg + wa ) -  Aq(0g +wg) - p ( ^  + w) = q<f>k (6)
Eq. (6) is consistent with Eq.(2) and it can be separated as Eq. (7) and Eq. (8)
\  A2(7s -  Aqtg -p<t> = qfa (7)
i A2a 2wgg -  Aqwg -p w  = 0 (8)
Since the original partial differential equation, Eq. (2), has been transformed as two
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functions of ^(g,&) and w (g), the boundary conditions, Eqs. (3) and (4), also
need to be transformed. The new boundary conditions are shown as follows: 
lim F(g,k) = lim <f>(g,k)+ lim w(g) = 0
g —^—OO g —►—00 £ —>—00
F(g,k) = (/>{g,k) + Mig) = B(g)  
or
lim0(g,k) = O,0(g,k) = O (9)
lim w(g) = 0, w(g) = B (g) (10)
Eq. (8) is an ordinary differential equation and its result can be written as
w(g) = B(g)e~m,gem,g = B (g)emi(g~g) (8a)
q + J q 2+2 a 2p
X(7,
Regarding the solution process of Eq. (7), one needs to employ the Separable 
Differential Equation again
Let <p{g,k) = G(g)K(k) (11)
1 ,2  iG ” , G' K'
2 ’ ~G~ q~G~P = q~K= a  ( ^
or
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^ < t,2G' -  AqG' ~ (p  + a)G = 0 




Eq.(12) is an ordinary differential equation, hence by ordinary solution process, and 
by letting G(g) = A • eng, we obtained the result below as follows:
where p  -  q2 + 2<j s2 (p  + a ) is an eigenvalue 
By letting p  = p 2 to facihtate the following discussion,
There are three cases to consider for the constant, p , in Eqs. (13) and (14): whether it 
is positive, zero, or negative
when p  is negative, the non-trivial solution can be obtained, and the eigenfunction
is
(16)
Eigenvalue : p  = - p 2 = q2 + 2<j 2 (p + a)<  0
Solving eq.(14)
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K ' - - K  = 0
-k
K  = deq (11-a)
<f>(g,k) = G(g)K(k)
<?g
X a .1 .tn-BLcotAL+m.P-*-
A g , Xcr, A g ,
=*-k 
? 9 (111>)
F(g,k) = <t>(g,k) + w(g)
Meanwhile, w(g) and <f>(g,k) have been solved as (8a),(8b) and (1 la),(l lb)
i.e. F(g,k) = Y dAne
SM_
X a } - t a n - ^ c o s -^ ^ + s in ^ ^ -  
A g ;  A g , A g ,




Finally, substituting the initial equation, Eq.(5),into Eq.(17), then An can be obtained
F (g fi)  = h(g) = f j Ane1°'
n=1 A g , A g , A g ,
g - ( -
- i  [ K g ) - m e ^ - g)\ e ^ tan ^  cos + sin
A g , A g ,2 A g ,2 dg
A = 0 (18)
Therefore, F(g,k) = B (g )em'(8 8) (19)
Eq. (18) states that whatever the value of /z(g), An is always equal to zero. This is 
a significant finding because Eq. (18) makes the evaluation of optimal contingent
value of OMRs a very simple task. The optimal contingent value of OMRs, taking
188
into consideration the asymmetry payoff and remaining repurchase amount, is 
dependent on the maximum bound of g ,  g , maximum value of F(g, k )  and the 
other necessary given input variables.
This solution might seem troubling in that it does not appear to depend on k . In fact, 
it does depend on k , through the “constant” 5 ( g ) . As we will see, k must be 
found in conjunction with the boundary g* = g* (k ), and hence will vary with k .
[Remark]: The above derivation can refer to Nagle/ Saff/Snider, 1996, Fundamentals of Differential 
Equations and Boundary Value Problems CH. 11.
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